

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology
June 12-14,
2009

Indiana University
Bloomington

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Preface

Welcome to the campus of Indiana University for the 35th annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology. An excellent program has been assembled by program chairs Tania Lombrozo and Tony Chemero.

There are several special events beginning with Thursday's pre-conference workshop on "Animal Neuroethics", co-organized by Martha Farah, Adam Shriver, and Colin Allen. On Friday evening is the poster madness session, strictly enforced one-minute mini-talks by all poster presenters—always a lot of fun! Evening poster sessions are on Friday and Saturday and there will be hors d'œuvres and a cash bar at each. An open discussion of diversity and the SPP has been organized at lunch time (bring your own) on Saturday, June 13th, by Anne Jacobson, that will be attended by Virginia Valian, whose work on diversity is highly regarded.

The future of SPP depends on the work of many volunteers, and also on your participation. Please plan to attend the business meeting on Sunday, where the agenda will cover various issues affecting the future of the Society. (You may pre-order a box lunch for \$10 at the registration desk before Friday 12:30 p.m. otherwise you must bring your own.)

Later that evening we hope you will join us for the reception and banquet following the Presidential Address. The reception and banquet are in IU's Art Museum (designed by I.M. Pei) where you will be able to enjoy music provided by the Afro-Hoosiers (SPP-alum Bob Port is one of the musicians) and visit the IU's collections of ancient and Asian art and artifacts. Special reception-only tickets are available to student registrants for the music and hors d'œuvres for \$12 (cash bar) from the conference registration desk. A few banquet tickets are available for \$60, also from registration.

The conference is generously supported by the Department of Philosophy, the Cognitive Science Program, and the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University. Special funding has also been provided for diversity programming by the Indiana AGEP Program through the University Graduate School. The pre-conference workshop on Animal Neuroethics is supported by the Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions at Indiana University and the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics.

In addition to those mentioned above, thanks go to all who refereed papers for the conference or served on the prize committees, and to the student volunteers. Special votes of thanks are owed to SPP Communications Officer Michael Anderson, Stanton Prize Coordinator Rebecca Saxe, all the other members of the Executive Committee, and especially Secretary/Treasurer Tom Polger, who despite becoming the father of triplets just before last year's conference, has managed to move the SPP forward in numerous ways this past year. You'll make Tom especially happy if you ask him about taking out a lifetime membership (or send him the form from our website at www.socphilpsych.org).

We hope that in addition to enjoying the conference itself you'll have a chance to explore the campus and Bloomington. Included with your program is information about the diverse restaurants that are just a short walk from the Indiana Memorial Union.

Jonathan Weinberg, Local Host
Colin Allen, President
Bloomington, June 2009

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

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35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Schedule of Events		
Thursday, June 11		
12:30–6:00	Pre-Conference Workshop on Animal Neuroethics	IMU-Walnut
Friday, June 12		
8:00–8:45	Coffee and Light Breakfast	Woodburn 101
8:45–10:00	Conference Welcome and Plenary Session	Woodburn 101
10:00–10:15	Coffee Break	IMU-Trees Lounge
10:15–1:15	Contributed Session A: Reductionism in neuroscience Contributed session B: Language and semantics	IMU-Dogwood IMU-Georgian
1:15–2:45	Lunch Break (Executive Committee Meeting in IMU-Georgian)	
2:45–6:00	Invited Symposium: Evolution at 150	Woodburn 101
6:00–6:15	Break	
6:15–7:00	Poster Madness	Woodburn 101
7:00–9:00	Poster Session	IMU-Frangipani
Saturday, June 13		
8:30–9:00	Coffee and Light Breakfast	Woodburn 101
9:00–10:00	Stanton Award Address	Woodburn 101
10:00–10:15	Coffee Break	Woodburn 101
10:15–1:15	Invited Symposium: Implicit and explicit beliefs	Woodburn 101
1:15–2:45	Lunch Break (Diversity Discussion in State Room East)	
2:45–5:45	Contributed session C: Philosophy of cognitive science Contributed session D: Moral psychology	IMU-Oak IMU-Georgian
5:45–6:00	Break	
6:00–7:30	Poster Session	IMU-Frangipani
Sunday, June 14		
8:30–9:00	Coffee and Light Breakfast	Woodburn 101
9:00–10:00	Plenary Session	Woodburn 101
10:00–10:15	Coffee Break	IMU-Trees Lounge
10:15–1:15	Contributed session E: Embodied cognition Contributed session F: Representation and belief	IMU-Dogwood IMU-Georgian
1:15–3:00	Lunch Break (Business Meeting in Woodburn 101)	
3:00–6:00	Invited symposium: Complex systems	Woodburn 101
6:00–6:15	Coffee Break	Woodburn 101
6:15–7:15	Presidential Address	Woodburn 101
7:15–8:15	Reception	IU Art Museum Sculpture Terrace
8:15–10:00	Banquet	IU Art Museum

35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Program for Thursday, June 11		
12:30–6:00	PRE-CONFERENCE WORKSHOP ON ANIMAL NEUROETHICS	IMU-Walnut
	Participants: Martha Farah , University of Pennsylvania Adam Shriver , Washington University St. Louis Adrienne Martin , University of Pennsylvania Valerie Hardcastle , University of Cincinnati Mena Morales , Washington University St. Louis Ken Sufka , University of Mississippi Lida Anestidou , Institute of Lab Animal Research, National Academies of Sciences Colin Allen , Indiana University	
12:30–1:00	ORIENTATION	
1:00–2:30	TOPIC: Philosophical background to animal neuroethics	
	Chair: Colin Allen	
1:00–1:25	Adrienne Martin <i>Introduction to animal ethics</i>	
1:25–1:50	Valerie Hardcastle <i>Introduction to pain in philosophy of mind</i>	
1:50–2:15	Adam Shriver <i>Synthesis of animal ethics and pain in philosophy of mind</i>	
2:15–2:30	General Discussion	
2:30–2:45	BREAK	
2:45–4:15	TOPIC: Neuroscience background to animal neuroethics	
	Chair: Adam Shriver	
2:45–3:10	Martha Farah <i>Introduction to neuroethics</i>	
3:10–3:35	Mena Morales <i>Introduction to neuroscience of pain</i>	
3:35–4:00	Ken Sufka <i>Synthesis of neuroethics and neuroscience of pain and suffering</i>	
4:00–4:15	General Discussion	
4:15–4:30	COFFEE BREAK	
4:30–6:00	TOPIC: Identifying tractable questions and methods for answering them	
	Chair: Martha Farah	
4:30–4:45	Lida Anestidou <i>Recognition and alleviation of pain in laboratory animals</i>	
4:45–6:00	Roundtable Discussion	

35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Program for Friday, June 12		
8:00–8:45	COFFEE AND LIGHT BREAKFAST	Woodburn 101
8:45–10:00	CONFERENCE WELCOME AND PLENARY SESSION	Woodburn 101
	Chair: Colin Allen , Indiana University	
8:45–9:00	Conference Welcome	
9:00–10:00	Ruth Millikan , University of Connecticut <i>Language without a theory of mind</i>	
10:00–10:15	COFFEE BREAK	IMU-Trees Lounge
10:15–1:15	CONTRIBUTED SESSION A: Reductionism in neuroscience	IMU-Dogwood
	Chair: Whit Schonbein , College of Charleston	
10:15–11:15	Kenneth Aizawa , Centenary College of Louisiana <i>Do scientists block multiple realization by sub-typing properties?</i> Commentator: Andrew Brook , Carleton University	
11:15–12:15	Jason A. Clark , Syracuse University <i>What homology can do for empirical psychology: An argument that some higher cognitive emotions are homologous to basic emotions</i> Commentator: Anne Jacobson , University of Houston	
12:15–1:15	Daniel A. Weiskopf , Georgia State University <i>The functional unity of special science kinds</i> Commentator: Thomas Polger , University of Cincinnati	
10:15–1:15	CONTRIBUTED SESSION B: Language and semantics	IMU-Georgian
	Chair: Joshua Alexander , Siena College	
10:15–11:15	Anna Papafragou, University of Delaware and John Trueswell , University of Pennsylvania <i>Dual-task studies of event perception</i> Commentator: Sarah-Jane Leslie , Princeton University	
11:15–12:15	Edouard Machery , Christopher Olivola, and Molly DeBlanc, University of Pittsburgh <i>Multi-kulti semantics</i> Commentator: Michael Devitt , CUNY Graduate Center	
12:15–1:15	Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Livengood , University of Pittsburgh (Winner of the William James Prize) <i>A new perspective concerning experiments on semantic intuitions</i> Commentator: Ron Mallon , University of Utah	

35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Friday, June 12		
1:15–2:45	LUNCH BREAK (EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN IMU-GEORGIAN)	
2:45–6:00	INVITED SYMPOSIUM: Evolution at 150	Woodburn 101
	Chair: Louise Antony , University of Massachusetts	
2:45–3:20	Michael Weisberg , University of Pennsylvania	
3:20–3:55	Denise Cummins , University of Illinois	
3:55–4:30	Peter Todd , Indiana University	
	<i>Decision making with evolution in mind</i>	
4:30–5:05	Robert Richardson , University of Cincinnati	
5:05–5:40	William Wimsatt , University of Chicago	
	<i>The crucial role of development in a theory of cultural evolution</i>	
6:00–6:15	BREAK	
6:15–7:00	POSTER MADNESS	Woodburn 101
7:00–9:00	POSTER SESSION	IMU-Frangipani

35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Program for Saturday, June 13		
8:30–9:00	COFFEE AND LIGHT BREAKFAST	Woodburn 101
9:00–10:00	STANTON AWARD ADDRESS	Woodburn 101
	Chair: John Doris , Washington University Joshua Knobe , Yale University <i>Compared to the norm</i>	
10:00–10:15	COFFEE BREAK	Woodburn 101
10:15–1:15	INVITED SYMPOSIUM: Implicit and explicit beliefs	Woodburn 101
10:15–10:55	Rob Wilson , University of Alberta <i>Implicit cognition and extended sociality, and vice-versa: on some relationships between mind and society</i>	
10:55–11:35	Virginia Valian , Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center <i>Gender schemas and the male superiority effect</i>	
11:35–12:15	Tamar Gendler , Yale University <i>Alief is good for me; is it good for you too?</i>	
12:15–12:55	Susan Gelman , University of Michigan <i>Psychological essentialism as a source of implicit beliefs</i>	
1:15–2:45	LUNCH BREAK (DIVERSITY DISCUSSION IN STATE ROOM EAST)	
2:45–5:45	CONTRIBUTED SESSION C: Philosophy of cognitive science	IMU-Oak
	Chair: Andrew Brook , Carleton University	
2:45–3:45	Carrie Figdor , University of Iowa <i>What is a piece of mind?</i> Commentator: Robert Van Gulick , Syracuse University	
3:45–4:45	Matt Bateman , University of Pennsylvania <i>Reverse inference</i> Commentator: John Bickle , University of Cincinnati	
4:45–5:45	Cameron Buckner and Leah Savion, Indiana University <i>Heuristics are a natural kind</i> Commentator: Paul Sheldon Davies , College of William and Mary	

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Saturday, June 13		
2:45–5:45	CONTRIBUTED SESSION D: Moral psychology	IMU-Georgian
	Chair: Jennifer Cole Wright , College of Charleston	
2:45–3:45	Deena Skolnick Weisberg and Alan M. Leslie, Rutgers University <i>Do emotions underlie children's moral judgments?</i> Commentator: Alison Niedbalski , University of California, Berkeley	
3:45–4:45	Gunnar Bjornsson and Karl Persson, University of Gothenburg <i>Judgments of moral responsibility: A unified account</i> Commentator: Felipe De Brigard , University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	
4:45–5:45	Kevin Uttich and Tania Lombrozo, University of California, Berkeley <i>Moral norms inform mental state ascriptions: An alternative explanation for the side-effect effect</i> Commentator: Jennifer Cole Wright , College of Charleston	
5:45–6:00	BREAK	
6:00–7:30	POSTER SESSION	IMU-Frangipani

35 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology		
Program for Sunday, June 14		
8:30–9:00	COFFEE AND LIGHT BREAKFAST	Woodburn 101
9:00–10:00	PLENARY SESSION	Woodburn 101
	Chair: Rob Goldstone , Indiana University Daniel Simons , University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign <i>Failures of visual awareness</i>	
10:00–10:15	COFFEE BREAK	IMU-Trees Lounge
10:15–1:15	CONTRIBUTED SESSION E: Embodied cognition	IMU-Dogwood
	Chair: Anthony Beavers , University of Evansville	
10:15–11:15	Carlos Zednik , Indiana University <i>The varieties of dynamicism</i> Commentator: Michael Silberstein , Elizabethtown College	
11:15–12:15	David Michael Kaplan , Washington University in St. Louis <i>Reframing the debate over embodied perception</i> Commentator: Georg Theiner , University of Alberta	
12:15–1:15	Marcus Arvan , University of British Columbia <i>Something mental is just in the head, and what the mental out of it is like</i> Commentator: Justin Fisher , Southern Methodist University	
10:15–1:15	CONTRIBUTED SESSION F: Representation and belief	IMU-Georgian
	Chair: Charles Wallis , California State University Long Beach	
10:15–11:15	Melody Dye , Michael Ramscar and Nal Kalchbrenner, Stanford University <i>No representation without taxation: The costs & benefits of learning to conceptualize the environment</i> Commentator: Jackie Sullivan , University of Alabama at Birmingham	
11:15–12:15	Fernando Martinez-Manrique , University of Granada, Spain <i>Is semantic representation a distinct representational kind?</i> Commentator: Sandeep Prasada , Hunter College	
12:15–1:15	Maura Tumulty , Colgate University <i>Delusions and dispositional beliefs</i> Commentator: Kristin Andrews , York University	

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Sunday, June 14		
1:15–3:00	LUNCH BREAK (BUSINESS MEETING IN WOODBURN 101)	
3:00–6:00	INVITED SYMPOSIUM: Complex systems	Woodburn 101
	Chair: Michael Anderson , Franklin and Marshall College	
3:00–3:40	Linda Smith , Indiana University	
3:40–4:20	Scott Kelso , Center for Complex Systems and Brain Sciences, Florida Atlantic University	
	<i>Mechanisms and principles of adaptive change</i>	
4:20–5:00	Robert Goldstone , Indiana University	
	<i>Human Collective Behavior as a Complex System</i>	
5:00–5:40	William Bechtel , University of California, San Diego	
	<i>Thinking dynamically about cognitive mechanisms</i>	
6:00–6:15	COFFEE BREAK	Woodburn 101
6:15–7:15	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS	Woodburn 101
	Chair: Bertram Malle	
	Colin Allen , Indiana University	
	<i>Similar minds</i>	
7:15–8:15	RECEPTION	IU Art Museum Sculpture Terrace
8:15–10:00	BANQUET	IU Art Museum

All SPP registrants are invited to attend these lectures at the North American Computing and Philosophy Conference:

Monday, June 14		
9:00–10:00	THE HERBERT A. SIMON KEYNOTE ADDRESS	IMU-Oak
	William Bechtel , University of California, San Diego	
	<i>Networks at multiple levels: understanding circadian phenomena</i>	
10:00–11:00	THE DOUGLAS C. ENGELBART KEYNOTE ADDRESS	IMU-Oak
	Olaf Sporns , Indiana University	
	<i>Network neuroscience—a new perspective on brain function</i>	

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Poster Presentations

Posters may be viewed any time after lunch on Friday

Frangipani Room

1. **Athena Aktipis**, University of Arizona
Do we need complex cognition for the evolution of cooperation? Implications of conditional movement
 2. **Michael L. Anderson**, Franklin and Marshall College, and Michael Silberstein, Elizabethtown College
Constraints on localization as an explanatory strategy in the biological sciences
 3. **Sharon Lee Armstrong**, La Salle University
What subjects report about their conceptual knowledge depends
 4. **Mark Bauer**, Michigan State University
Psychological laws (revisited)
 5. **Andrew Brook**, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Philosophy in and philosophy of cognitive science
 6. **Stephen Butterfill**, University of Warwick (UK)
Minimal theory of mind
 7. **Sarah Meerschaert**, Franklin and Marshall College
The aftermath: Reconstructing virtue in light of situationism
 8. **John J. Crow**, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Mad dog empiricism
 9. **Fred Cummins**, University College Dublin
Deep affordance: Seeing the self in the world
 10. **Laura Danon**, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba
Belief attribution to non-human animals: A dispositional approach
 11. **Paul Sheldon Davies**, College of William and Mary
The psychology of 'purpose'
 12. **Zoe Drayson**, University of Bristol, UK
Representation hungry' cases of behavior: Food for thought
 13. **Samantha Godwin**, Georgetown University
Can psychotherapy be scientific?
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Poster Presentations

Posters may be viewed any time after lunch on Friday

Frangipani Room

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14. **Steve Guglielmo** and Bertram F. Malle, Brown University
The timing of blame and intentionality: Testing the moral bias hypothesis
-
15. **Steven Horst**, Wesleyan University
Beyond modularity and globalism: A case for cognitive pluralism
-
16. Eranda Jayawickreme, University of Pennsylvania, Hailey Strobel, UNC-Charlotte,
Sarah Meerschaert and Anthony Chemero, Franklin and Marshall College
Empirically studying virtue: A new means of finding cross-situational consistency
-
17. **Tyler Kasperbauer**, Texas A&M University
The possibility of ape morality: A critique of Prinzian sentimentalism
-
18. **Tamar Kushnir** and Henry M. Wellman, Cornell University
Preschoolers' understanding of freedom of choice
-
19. **Trevor Kvaran**, Alan Sanfey, Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona
Cognitive and emotional components of moral judgment
-
20. **Ronald Loeffler**, Grand Valley State University
(Simple, pragmatically undemanding) assertional practice without higher order thought
-
21. **Robert W. Lurz**, Brooklyn College, CUNY
If chimpanzees are mindreaders, could behavioral science tell?
-
22. **Eric Mandelbaum** and David Ripley, UNC Chapel-Hill
Explaining the abstract/concrete paradoxes in moral psychology
-
23. **Dylan Murray**, Georgia State University
Psychopathy and the comprehension of moral norms
-
24. **Jennifer Nado**, Rutgers University
Experimental philosophy and skepticism
-
25. **Youngsup Park**, Johns Hopkins University
The doorknob/DOORKNOB problem
-
26. **Jonathan S. Phillips**, UNC-Chapel Hill
Value judgments and freedom: An experimental analysis
-

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Poster Presentations

Posters may be viewed any time after lunch on Friday

Frangipani Room

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27. **Michael Ramscar** and Melody Dye, Stanford University
Error and expectation in learning: The many curious incidents of 'mouses' in adult speech
-
28. **Teed Rockwell**, Sonoma State University
Extended cognition and intrinsic properties
-
29. **Andrew Shtulman**, Occidental College
Cross-domain correspondences in the evaluation of modal claims
-
30. **John Spackman**, Middlebury College
Graded conceptualism
-
31. **Shannon Spaulding**, University of Wisconsin at Madison
The mark of the cognitive
-
32. **Justin Sytsma**, University of Pittsburgh
Does heterophenomenology concede too much?
-
33. **Serife Tekin**, York University
Identity through the diagnostic glass
-
34. **Georg Theiner**, University of Alberta
The measure of a group mind
-
35. **Steven J. Todd**, University of Connecticut
Slow down you move too fast: A problem for neural definitions of consciousness
-
36. **Daniel Yarlett**, Michael Ramscar, Melody Dye and Benjamin Hersch, Stanford University
The feature label order effect in symbolic learning
-
37. **Caren M. Walker** and Ellen Winner, Boston College
Biological vs. artificial life: Challenges to children's essentialist reasoning
-
38. **Joseph Williams** and Tania Lombrozo, University of California, Berkeley
Explaining promotes discovery: Evidence from category learning
-
39. **Jennifer Wright**, Piper Grandjean and Cullen McWhite, College of Charleston
The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Objectivism revisited
-
40. **Tadeusz Zawidzki**, George Washington University
An empirical test for natural normativity
-

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Authors

Kenneth Aizawa
Session A

Do scientists block multiple realization by sub-typing properties?

Suppose that scientists have a high level property that is prima facie multiply realized by two distinct sets of lower level properties. In response to this situation, they could decide to take things at face value and conclude that the higher level property is in fact so multiply realized. Another response, however, would be for scientists to postulate two subtypes of the higher level property. By adopting this latter course, it is possible for scientists to block the multiple realization of a property by sub-typing the property. This paper will argue that the issue is more complex than is captured by the formal schema just set forth. Using an example from vision science, it will argue that scientists do not uniformly adopt one strategy or another; which strategy they adopt depends on additional factors.

Colin Allen
Sunday plenary session

Similar minds

Lida Anestidou
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

Marcus Arvan
Session E

Something mental is just in the head, and what the mental out of it is like

In his recent article, “Why Nothing Mental Is Just in The Head,” Justin Fisher argues from a novel thought-experiment to the conclusion that every form of mental internalism (the view that “an individual’s mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individual’s head at that time”) is false. I argue in this paper that Fisher leaves important phenomenological details out of his thought-experiment, and that when these details are introduced, it is evident not only that a form of mental internalism (“narrow phenomenal internalism”) is true, but also evident that a mental state represents features of the external world in a genuinely mental way (as opposed to a merely behavioral way – a distinction that I will clarify) just in case the state both (1) functions to detect those features, but also (2) phenomenally resembles those features, as well. I conclude that Fisher’s example therefore disconfirms purely teleosemantic theories of mental content (i.e., theories that aim to understand the content of mental states solely in terms of functional characteristics).

Authors

Matt Bateman
Session C

Reverse inference

In this paper I look at two apparently impressive strategies in functional neuroimaging. The first is reverse inference, the attempt to infer mental states based on the activation of particular brain regions. The second is multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), a powerful and fairly novel algorithmic technique for pulling patterns out of brain data, with impressive predictive results. I do so with a sensitivity towards potential misunderstandings of the explanatory power of functional neuroimaging—particularly with an eye towards debunking these as reductive—and a view towards critically assessing what such methods actually get us. Both methods can stake a claim to bridging the neural and the mental by a strong epistemic relation long associated with explanation and reduction: that of prediction. However, reverse inferences are crippled by the fact that localization is a one-way street: one can infer the function of a brain region from its correlation with a cognitive process, but one cannot infer a cognitive process from the function of a brain region. MVPA allows for a specific kind of reverse inference, but typically at the cost of some localization (in extreme cases, localization can be lost entirely), the introduction of additional complexity, and, most importantly, a tremendous amount of predictive scope. So reverse inferences are still rarely, if ever, warranted.

**Gunnar Björnsson and
Karl Persson**
Session D

Judgments of moral responsibility: A unified account

Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Studies by Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in a deterministic scenario depends on whether these actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression these actions seem to represent. Studies by Nahmias et. al. (2007) show that the kind of determinism involved can affect assignments of responsibility. When deterministic scenarios were described using reductionist explanations of action, subjects were significantly less prone to ascribe responsibility than when the deterministic laws were described as involving ordinary psychological concepts. Finally, a study by Knobe (2003) suggests that people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the agent just doesn't care about these side effects.

Elsewhere (Björnsson and Persson 2009), we have presented an analysis of our everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, accounting for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility.

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Cameron Buckner and Leah Savion
Session C

Heuristics are a natural kind

Research on inferential heuristics stands out in current cognitive science as being both highly successful and in very little agreement about the nature of its central posits. When scientists enter into ontological disagreement about the nature of their phenomena of interest, it can be useful to ask whether any of their candidate definitions succeed in picking out a natural kind. We thus approach old debates about heuristics from a new perspective by asking the question, “Do heuristics form a natural kind?” A review of current neuroscience of category learning allows us to locate homeostatic processes which reliably produce representations possessing a set of characteristic properties. Similarity assessments operating on these representations will in turn possess the suite of properties typical of heuristics: speed, computational efficiency, a focus on small sets of ecologically-valid cues, and a small but usually manageable bias. These homeostatic processes satisfy Richard Boyd’s criteria for natural kinds, and thus support our central claim: that at least some heuristics, which we dub natural heuristics, form a natural kind. The implications of this claim for existing debates are then briefly explored.

Jason A. Clark
Session A

What homology can do for empirical psychology: An argument that some higher cognitive emotions are homologous to basic emotions

In the last ten years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology rather than in terms of shared function. Although the implications of this position extend to all psychological traits, the debate has centered around ‘emotion’ as an example of a psychological category ripe for reinterpretation within this new framework of classification. I address arguments by Griffiths that emotions should be divided into at least two distinct classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and that these two classes require radically different theories to explain them. Griffiths argues that while basic emotions in humans are homologous to the corresponding states in other animals, higher cognitive emotions are dependent on mental capacities unique to humans, and are therefore not homologous to basic emotions. Using the example of shame, I argue that (a) many emotions that are commonly classified as being higher cognitive emotions actually correspond to certain basic emotions, and that (b) the “higher cognitive forms” of these emotions are best seen as being homologous to their basic forms. I then outline some of the ways in which this way of viewing the relationship between basic and higher cognitive emotions might benefit empirical psychology.

Denise Cummins
Friday symposium

Topic: Evolution at 150

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Melody Dye, Michael Ramscar and Nal Kalchbrenner Session F	<i>No representation without taxation: The costs & benefits of learning to conceptualize the environment</i> How do the ways in which we learn influence our cognitive representations of what we learn? We show that in language learning tasks, the process of learning to conceptualize and categorize perceptual input shapes how that input gets represented in mind. In representation, there seems to be a give and take between veridicality and completeness, on the one hand, and discrimination and accurate categorization, on the other. Learning to better discriminate objects into categories based on their highly-discriminating features makes people less likely to notice or remember the same objects' less-discriminating features. Gains in response-discrimination between categories thus come at a cost to within category discrimination. We suggest that the mechanisms of human learning obey a simple principle: there can be no representation without taxation.
Martha Farah Thursday workshop	Topic: Animal Neuroethics
Carrie Figdor Session C	<i>What is a piece of mind?</i> A fundamental assumption of cognitive science is that the mind is divisible. This assumption grounds the search for mechanistic explanation of mental phenomena. I argue that cognitive scientists have not yet articulated adequate criteria for individuating mental individuals or identified mental part-whole relations. As a result, current talk of mental components and mental structures, and of mechanistic explanations of mind, are either merely metaphorical or empirically empty.
Susan Gelman Saturday symposium	<i>Psychological essentialism as a source of implicit beliefs</i> Topic: Implicit and explicit beliefs
Tamar Gendler Saturday symposium	<i>Alief is good for me; is it good for you too?</i> Topic: Implicit and explicit beliefs
Robert Goldstone Sunday symposium	<i>Human collective behavior as a complex system</i> Topic: Complex Systems Just as ants interact to form elaborate colonies and neurons interact to create structured thought, groups of people interact to create emergent organizations that the individuals may not understand or even perceive. My laboratory has been studying the emergence of group behavior from a complex systems perspective. We have developed experimental platforms on the web (http://groups.psych.indiana.edu/), in Second Life, and with student clicker response devices that allow groups of 2-200 people to interact with each other in real time. We have used these systems to study the spontaneous allocation of individuals to resources, group path formation, and the dissemination of innovations in social networks. In this talk, I will focus on a group coordination task that people solve by developing differentiated and specialized cognitive roles over rounds of play. The implications of the results for group cognition will be discussed.

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Authors

Valerie Hardcastle
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

David Michael Kaplan
Session E

Reframing the debate over embodied perception

The recent debate within philosophy and theoretical cognitive science over the embodied cognition perspective has been largely preoccupied with a radical thesis concerning the extended boundaries of cognition to include parts of the body and/or surrounding environment. In the context of related discussions about the embodiment of perception, this claim gets recast in terms of sensorimotor processes being part and parcel—genuine components—of perceptual processes. I argue that this way of defending a radical thesis about embodied perception is neither necessary nor advisable, and has obscured other potentially more fruitful paths to understanding how embodiment and motor behavior might matter for perception. I develop an alternate proposal centered on direct causal interactions between perception and motor action. After outlining this alternative and showing it to have radical import, I describe the kind of theoretical account and empirical data that bears on and can be mobilized in support of it.

Scott Kelso
Sunday symposium

Mechanisms and principles of adaptive change

Topic: Complex Systems

Joshua Knobe
Saturday plenary session

Compared to the norm

**Edouard Machery,
Christopher Olivola,
and Molly DeBlanc**
Session B

Multi-kulti semantics

Machery et al. (2004) reported some evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, but philosophers have identified several limits of Machery et al.'s empirical work. In this article, we examine some of these important criticisms, and we report new empirical results that rebut them.

Adrienne Martin
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

Mena Morales
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Authors

**Fernando
Martínez-Manrique**
Session F

Is semantic representation a distinct representational kind?

I address the problem of the distinction between semantic and conceptual representations from general considerations about how to distinguish a representational kind. I consider three different ways of telling representational kinds apart –in terms of structure, processing, and content–, and I examine if semantic representations may constitute a distinct kind with respect to each of them. I argue that the best options for semantic representation to be regarded as a distinct representational kind with respect to each of the three criteria conflict with each other. If they are a structurally distinct kind, the best option is to regard them as atomic representations. If they differ in terms of processing, they can be characterized as interface rules. If they are devoted to represent domain-specific contents, they appear as structured complexes that are typically processed in conjunction with concepts.

Ruth Millikan
Friday plenary session

Language without a theory of mind

If we adopt a certain view of language understanding, and have a flexible enough view of the different ways in which one mind can take account of another, it becomes clear that a child can get exceedingly far in learning language without having any theories or thoughts about other people's minds. The radical part here is the proposed view of language understanding. Interpreting what you hear through the medium of speech sounds is in relevant ways just like interpreting what you see through the medium of the structured light that strikes your eyes. Understanding speech is a form of perception of the world, as direct as seeing.

**Anna Papafragou and
John Trueswell**
Session B

Dual-task studies of event perception

What role does language play in attention allocation during event perception and in remembering events? Eye movements were recorded from 60 adults viewing animated motion events (e.g., a duck skating to a building) which they later recalled during a nonlinguistic video-recognition task. Half of the participants were native speakers of Greek, a language that tends to describe motion using goal-directed path verbs (approaching), and half were native speakers of English, which prefers manner/instrument verbs (skating). During event encoding, participants either viewed events freely (No Interference) or performed one of two interference tasks designed to either disrupt linguistic encoding (Linguistic Interference) or leave linguistic encoding intact (Nonlinguistic Interference). Eye movements revealed that, when event encoding was made difficult via Nonlinguistic Interference, participants spent extra time studying what their language considers to be the details of the event: Greek speakers inspected manner/instruments more, English speakers inspected path-endpoints more. This 'linguistic recoding' effect was eliminated under conditions of Linguistic Interference and when the task was made easier (No Interference). Surprisingly, this linguistic recoding strategy did not predict accuracy in the memory task. The two interference tasks reduced memory for Paths and Manners similarly with no interactions with native Language. The results indicate that core biases in event perception and memory are not shaped by one's native language and that language can be optionally recruited for encoding, especially under conditions of high cognitive load.

Robert Richardson
Friday symposium

Topic: Evolution at 150

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Authors

Adam Shriver
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

**Deena Skolnick
Weisberg and Alan M.
Leslie**
Session D

Do emotions underlie children's moral judgments?

What role do the emotions play in moral judgment? Many philosophers have proposed that emotions are necessary for our moral sense, and recent psychological and neurophysiological data support this view. Studies on the nature of children's moral judgements have additionally been used to bolster this claim. Specifically, developmental researchers have argued that children's ability to distinguish moral-rule violations from conventional-rule violations depends on their ability to sense others' harm, implying a central role for the emotions in moral judgment-making. But studies of the moral/conventional distinction confound violation type with emotional response: children are presented with stories in which characters always cry to show that they have been harmed by a moral-rule transgression but never cry following a conventional-rule transgression. So children could be following a simple heuristic to make the moral/conventional distinction: Any action that causes crying is morally bad. This heuristic would lead to incorrect responding to "crybaby" cases, in which a character cries as a result of an action that is not morally wrong. To test whether children in fact rely on this heuristic, we presented them with six stories that independently varied type of transgression (Moral, Conventional, or None) and presence of a distressed victim (With-Emotion, Without-Emotion). We found that children robustly distinguish the three types of transgression, judging moral-rule transgressions as worse than conventional-rule transgressions, which in turn were worse than non-transgressive actions. But emotional reactions to the transgression did not affect children's judgments; their responses to each type of action were the same regardless of whether the action made someone cry. These results suggest that children do not take emotions into account when making moral judgments.

Linda Smith
Sunday symposium

Topic: Complex Systems

**Justin Sytsma and
Jonathan Livengood**
Session B

A new perspective concerning experiments on semantic intuitions

(Winner of the William James Prize)

In two fascinating articles, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004; forthcoming) use experimental methods to raise a specter of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian subjects about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke's Gödel example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in subjects' intuitions about that case. We argue that this interpretation is mistaken. We detail a type of perspectival ambiguity found in Machery et al.'s probe but not yet noted in the response literature. We argue that this ambiguity could have affected their results. We do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies to test the impact of perspectival ambiguity on subjects' responses. We found that this accounts for much of the variation in Machery et al.'s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of our new data, their argument is no longer convincing.

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Authors

Ken Sufka
Thursday workshop

Topic: Animal Neuroethics

Peter Todd
Friday symposium

Decision making with evolution in mind
Topic: Evolution at 150

Maura Tumulty
Session F

Delusions and dispositional beliefs

In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel's dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to allow us to classify delusions as beliefs, this allowance isn't a robust vindication of doxasticism. The significance of the allowance can be increased by emphasizing the role of folk-psychological norms in individuating propositional attitudes. But letting those norms play a large role in the individuation of belief makes it hard to count as believers the deluded subjects who violate most such norms. Dispositionalism about belief can't defend doxasticism about delusion.

Kevin Uttich and Tania Lombrozo
Session D

Moral norms inform mental state ascriptions: An alternative explanation for the side-effect effect

Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than evaluating, behavior. In three experiments, we demonstrate that moral evaluations do inform ascriptions of intentional action, but that this relationship arises because behavior that conforms to norms (moral or otherwise) is less informative about underlying mental states than is behavior that violates norms. This analysis preserves the traditional understanding of theory of mind as a tool for predicting and explaining behavior, but also suggests the importance of normative considerations in social cognition.

Michael Weisberg
Friday symposium

Topic: Evolution at 150

35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

Authors

Daniel A. Weiskopf
Session A

The functional unity of special science kinds

The view that special science properties are multiply realizable has been attacked in recent years by Shapiro, Bechtel & Mundale, and others. Focusing on neuroscientific kinds, I argue that these attacks are unsuccessful. I suggest that, contra Shapiro, diverse mechanisms can converge on common functional properties at multiple levels, and that this is compatible with the existence of constraints on the evolution of cognitive systems. Finally, I briefly sketch how such functional categories might constitute special science kinds.

Rob Wilson
Saturday symposium

Implicit cognition and extended sociality, and vice-versa: on some relationships between mind and society

Topic: Implicit and explicit beliefs

William Wimsatt
Friday symposium

The crucial role of development in a theory of cultural evolution

Topic: Evolution at 150

Virginia Valian
Saturday symposium

Gender schemas and the male superiority effect

Topic: Implicit and explicit beliefs

Carlos Zednik
Session E

The varieties of dynamicism

The dynamical approach to cognition is often considered to be 'revolutionary'. In contrast to the well-established frameworks of computationalism and connectionism, dynamicism is typically thought to be anti-representational, holistic, phenomenological and law-based. In this paper, I argue that this way of thinking about dynamicism is too restrictive: it fails to capture the heterogeneous nature of dynamicist research. Although all dynamicist research projects share a commitment to the mathematical methods, tools, and concepts of dynamical systems theory, they frequently disagree with respect to the truth or falsity of representationalism, the role of holistic phenomenological modeling, and in general, the nature of dynamical explanation. As a result, only some dynamicist research projects seem genuinely opposed to the explanatory principles of 'pre-revolutionary' cognitive science.

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General Information

Book Exhibition

Exhibits from 10:00-3:00 in IMU-Walnut. Publishers include:

- Cambridge University Press
- Oxford University Press
- Routledge
- Wiley-Blackwell
- MIT Press

Emergency Information

For quick response 24 hrs a day, report any accident or emergency to the IMU hotel lobby front desk. If you have access to a telephone, call 911.

Emergency medical care is available at:

Promptcare East
326 South Woodcrest Drive
812-353-6888
8:00am–8:00pm, Monday–Sunday

Bloomington Hospital
601 West 2nd Street
Emergency Room: 812-353-9515
Open 24 hours Monday–Sunday

Childcare

The IMU maintains a lactation room, located in the women's restroom between Sugar and Spice and the Frangipani Room. Requires an access code which can be obtained by calling 855-3849 or visiting contacting the hotel registration desk. See <http://www.indiana.edu/~owa/familyfriendly.html#lactation> for a list of other lactation rooms on campus.

The Office For Womens Affairs keeps an Emergency Babysitter List for IU parents, and they will share the list with conference participants. The parent is then responsible for making the arrangements directly with one of the sitters on the list. Call the OWA at 812-855-3849 from 8-noon and 1-5 Monday - Friday to find out about obtaining a copy of the list.

Alcohol

All visitors are subject to Indiana University alcohol policies. Alcohol will be available for the banquet and other catered events, but may not be removed from the event room. Walking across campus with alcoholic beverages is prohibited.

Internet Access

Wireless access will be provided to all conference attendees. The necessary information for connecting to the campus network will be provided at registration.


Exercise at IU

Day passes to IU Recreational Sports facilities can be purchased at the HPER building (older, \$4/day) right next door to the IMU and the SRSC (newer, \$6/day) on the north edge of campus. Both facilities open at 6 a.m. on weekdays and 8 a.m. on the weekends, and are open until 9 or 10 p.m. As well as weights and equipment rooms, both facilities have swimming pools. HPER pool hours are limited to weekday lunch times and weekend afternoons during summer. There's also an outdoor pool at a separate facility that is open 7 days a week, but it's a bit more of a trek from the IMU. General info about all IU Rec Sports facilities is at <http://www.iurecsports.org/>



Conference Guide to Casual & Fine Dining

IU Bloomington Campus and Downtown Area



WALKING DIRECTIONS FROM THE INDIANA MEMORIAL UNION

1. WHEN LEAVING CONFERENCE LOUNGE AREA, EXIT THE IMU BUILDING THROUGH THE DOORS LEADING INTO THE GARDEN AREA.
2. WALK UP THE STAIRS TO THE SIDEWALK, TURN RIGHT AND WALK ALONG THE SIDEWALK UNTIL YOU SEE THE LARGE LIMESTONE GATES (SAMPLE GATES).
3. WALK THROUGH THE SAMPLE GATES.
- 4A. **TO GET TO KIRKWOOD AVENUE (5TH STREET):** KIRKWOOD IS STRAIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU AS YOU WALK THROUGH SAMPLE GATES
- 4B. **TO GET TO INDIANA & FOURTH STREET:** TURN LEFT ON INDIANA AVE, THEN TURN RIGHT ON TO 4TH STREET.
- 4C. **TO GET TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA:** CROSS INDIANA AVENUE AND WALK STRAIGHT DOWN KIRKWOOD UNTIL YOU COME TO THE COURTHOUSE. RESTAURANTS ARE AVAILABLE ON ALL SIDES OF THE COURTHOUSE SQUARE, AND WITHIN A BLOCK OR TWO IN EACH DIRECTION.

In the IMU

THE MARKET, BURGER KING, PIZZA HUT, KIVA
856-0379 ☼☼\$
(FAST FOOD)

STARBUCKS ☼
(COFFEE)

SUGAR 'N SPICE
(COFFEE & BAKERY)

TUDOR ROOM
855-1620 \$\$
(BUFFET)

DUNN INN
208 S. DUNN ST.
330-2002 ♥\$\$
(AMERICAN)

MANDALAY
413 E. 4TH ST.
339-7334 \$\$
(INTERNATIONAL)

PUCCINI'S LA DOLCE VITA
420 E. 4TH ST.
333-5522 \$\$\$
(ITALIAN)

SIAM HOUSE
430 E. 4TH ST.
331-1233 ♥\$\$
(THAI)

SNOW LION
113 S. GRANT ST.
336-0835 ♥\$\$
(TIBETAN)

Indiana Avenue

BUFFA LOUIE'S
114 S. INDIANA
333-3032 ≡\$\$
(WINGS)

CHOW BAR
216 S. INDIANA AVE.
336-3888 \$\$
(ASIAN)

DAGWOOD'S SUBS
116 S. INDIANA ☼☼\$

PENN STATION
212 S. INDIANA AVE.
333-7366 \$
(SANDWICHES)

QDOBA
116 S. INDIANA AVE.
339-1122 ☼\$
(MEXICAN)

STARBUCKS ☼
110 S. INDIANA
(COFFEE)

Kirkwood Area

BLOOMINGTON BAGEL
113 N. DUNN ST.
☼≡\$

CAFÉ DJANGO
116 N. GRANT ST.
335-1297 ♥\$\$
(INTERNATIONAL)

CAFÉ PIZZARIA
405 E. KIRKWOOD
332-2111 ≡\$\$

CHIPOTLE GRILL
E. KIRKWOOD AVENUE
330-1435 ♥\$\$
(MEXICAN)

ESAN THAI
221 E. KIRKWOOD
333-8424 \$\$
(THAI)

FALAFEL'S
430 E. KIRKWOOD AVE.
335-3555 \$
(GREEK/ISRAELI)

FINCH'S BRASSERIE
514 E. KIRKWOOD
333-2700 ♥\$\$\$
(GOURMET AMERICAN)

JIMMY JOHN'S DELI
430 E. KIRKWOOD ☼☼\$

KILROY'S BAR & GRILL
502 E. KIRKWOOD
332-3700 ☼☼\$

LAUGHING PLANET 322 E.
KIRKWOOD ♥\$
332-2233
(BURRITOS)

NICK'S ENGLISH HUT 423
E. KIRKWOOD ☼\$
332-4040
(BAR & GRILL)

NOODLES & COMPANY
517 E. KIRKWOOD \$\$
323-1400

THE POUR HOUSE CAFE
314 E KIRKWOOD \$
(COFFEE)

PITA PIT
530 E. KIRKWOOD ♥\$
335-3500
(SANDWICHES)

RUNCIBLE SPOON
412 E. 6TH ST.
334-3997 \$\$
(BREAKFAST, COFFEE,
SANDWICHES)

SHANTI
221 E. KIRKWOOD ♥\$
333-0303
(INDIAN)

SOMA
322 E. KIRKWOOD
(COFFEE & JUICE BAR)

THE FARM
108 E. KIRKWOOD ♥\$\$\$
323-0002
(INDIANA GOURMET)

UNCLE D'S PIZZA
430 E. KIRKWOOD ≡\$
339-2260

VILLAGE DELI
409 E. KIRKWOOD ≡♥\$
336-2303
(BREAKFASTS, SANDICHES)

Downtown Area

BLOOMINGTON BAGEL
238 N. MORTON ST.
☼≡\$

BLOOMINGTON SANDWICH
107 N. COLLEGE ≡\$\$
330-9611

BOBBY'S PUB
100 COLLEGE AVE. \$
330-0955

BUTCH'S
120 E. 7TH ST. \$
822-0210
(NEW JERSEY, ITALIAN &
JEWISH)

COACHES LOUNGE
245 N. COLLEGE AVE
339-3537 \$\$
(BAR & GRILL)

CRAZY HORSE
214 W. KIRKWOOD ☼\$
336-8877
(BAR & GRILL)

GRAZIE!
106 W. 6TH ST. \$
323-0303
(ITALIAN)

IRISH LION
212 W. KIRKWOOD AVE. \$
336-9076
(IRISH BAR & GRILL)

JANKO'S LITTLE ZAGREB
223 W. 6TH ST. \$\$\$
332-0694
(STEAKHOUSE)

JAPONEE
320 N. WALNUT ST. \$
333-3122
(ASIAN)

KILROY'S SPORTS BAR
319 N. WALNUT ST. ≡☼\$
333-6006

MALIBU GRILL
106 N. WALNUT ST. ♥\$
332-4334

MAX'S PLACE
109 W. 7TH ST. \$
336-5169
(PIZZA & PUB)

MICHAEL'S UPTOWN CAFÉ
102 E. KIRKWOOD ☼♥\$\$\$
339-0900
(AMERICAN & CAJUN)

OPIE TAYLOR'S
110 N. WALNUT ST. ≡\$
333-7287
(BAR & GRILL)

LEGEND

- \$ = Inexpensive
- \$\$ = Average
- \$\$\$ = Above Average
- ☼ = Delivery
- ♥ = Vegetarian friendly
- ☼ = IMU Room service
- ☼ = Wifi

LE PETITE CAFÉ
308 W. 6TH ST.
334-9747 \$\$
(FRENCH)

RESTAURANT TALLENT
208 N. WALNUT ST.
330-9801 ♥ \$\$\$

ROOTS
124 N. WALNUT ST.
336-7668 ♥ \$\$\$
(VEGETARIAN FOOD &
JUICE BAR)

SAMIRA
100 W. 6TH ST.
331-3761 ♥ \$\$\$
(AFGHAN)

**SCHOLAR'S INN
BAKEHOUSE**
125 N. COLLEGE AVE.
3002 E. THIRD ST. ♣ \$
(BAKERY & SANDWICHES)

SCOTTY'S BREWHOUSE
302 N. WALNUT ST.
333-5151 \$
(BURGERS, ETC.)

STEFANO'S ICE CAFÉ
101 W. KIRKWOOD ♣ \$
(ICE CREAM, COFFEE)

TROJAN HORSE
100 E. KIRKWOOD
332-1101 ♥ \$\$\$
(GREEK)

Other Spots Near Campus

[♠ = NEAR WILKIE DORMS]

AMI ♠
1500 E. 3RD ST.
339-7868 \$
(JAPANESE)

BEAR'S PLACE ♠
1316 E. 3RD ST.
339-3460 \$
(BAR & GRILL)

BIG MOUTH SUBS ♠
1420 E. 3RD ST.
323-8987 ♣ \$\$\$

CITY BAKERY ♠
1318 E. THIRD ST.
323-9904 \$
(COFFEE)

COPPER CUP ♠
1400 E. THIRD ST.
415 N. COLLEGE AVE ♣
(COFFEE)

DRAGON EXPRESS ♠
1400 E. THIRD ST.
331-7030 \$
(ASIAN)

THE MAC GRILL ♠
1434 E. THIRD ST.
334-9100 \$
(INTERNATIONAL)

MOTHER BEAR'S PIZZA
1428 E. 3RD ST. ♠
332-4495 ♣ \$\$\$

TINA'S CUISINE
309 E. 3RD ST.
332-0464 ♣ ♥ \$\$\$
(GOURMET GROCERIES &
SANDWICHES)

TURKUAZ CAFE
301 E. THIRD ST.
333-7908 ♣ \$
(INTERNATIONAL)

YOGI'S BAR & GRILL
519 E. 10TH ST.
323-9644 \$
(BURGERS, ETC.)

Further Afield (BUT WORTH THE TRIP)

CHOCOLATE MOOSE
401 S. WALNUT ST. \$
(ICE CREAM)

LENNIE'S ♠
1795 E. 10TH ST.
323-2112 \$
(BAR & GRILL, PIZZA)

LIMESTONE GRILLE
2920 E. COVENANTER
335-8110 ♥ \$\$\$
(AMERICAN FINE DINING;
NOT EASILY WALK-ABLE)

RAGGAZZI ARTE CAFÉ
212 S. ROGERS ST.
323-9005 \$
(ITALIAN)

SOBON
1811 E 10TH ST.
333-1004 \$
(KOREAN)

SCHOLAR'S INN
717 N. COLLEGE AVE.
332-1892 \$\$\$
(AMERICAN FINE DINING)

TRUFFLE'S 56 DEGREES
1131 S. COLLEGE MALL
330-1111 \$\$\$
(AMERICAN FINE DINING;
NOT WALK-ABLE)

UPLAND BREWING CO.
254 N. WALNUT ST.
336-2337 \$
(BAR & GRILL)



CITY ORDINANCE:
Smoking is prohibited
in all public places
and work places.




IU Conferences

Restaurants that get JW's particular seal of approval

- * For fine dining: Farm and Tallent
- * Michael's Uptown (especially for biscuits and gravy, or the gumbo "Hoosier style")
- * Esan Thai
- * Upland Brewery or Lennie's for local beer (and awesome stromboli at Lennie's, too – although in the opposite direction from most Bloomington eateries, Lennie's is easily walkable from the conference location)
- * Lunch buffet at Chow Bar
- * Finch's Brasserie (often has some interesting beer on tap)
- * Mozzarella sticks at Opie Taylor's
- * Chocolate Moose for soft-serve ice cream, and if for no other reason than it appears in the video for John Cougar Mellencamp's "Jack & Diane" and in Bloomington's own brush with Hollywood: *Breaking Away*.
- * Good, cheap bets for vegetarians: Roots; Laughing Planet



Indiana University Bloomington Campus



Academic Campus Pedestrian Safety

..... Use lighted pedestrian routes, especially when walking home

24-hour access telephone


Emergency telephone or pay phone (9-1-1 no coin needed)

Emergency facilities

IU Police Department

Fire Department

IU Golf Course (see reverse side) →



Registration, book exhibit, and meetings rooms for contributed talks and posters: Indiana Memorial Union (IMU; see map next page)

Plenary Sessions:
Woodburn Hall, Rm 101

Reception and Banquet
location: IU Art Museum

Dormitory
Accommodations: Wilkie
Quadrangle

Indiana Memorial Union

Map

Diversity Luncheon
State Room
East

Contributed Sessions:
Georgian
Dogwood
Oak

Registration
Trees Lounge


Workshop & Book Exhibit
Walnut

Posters
Frangipani

Legend

- handicap accessible
- men's restroom
- women's restroom
- elevator
- public telephone
- escalator
- ATM machine
- E-mail station
- Ticketmaster™

*Does not access hotel rooms



EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Tornado: In the event of a tornado or severe weather warning, move to interior areas without windows, such as restrooms, stairwells, or hallways and close any doors.

Fire: In the event of a fire, exit the building through the nearest exit door or stairwell. Do not use the elevator.