Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2008
PRE-CONFERENCE WORKSHOP ON EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
IRCS Conference Room
3401 Walnut Street, 4th Floor, Suite 400A

Wednesday, June 25th - 1:30-6:30pm

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<td>10:00am-6:00pm</td>
<td>Workshop Registration</td>
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<td>IRCS Conference Room</td>
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Chair: Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dept. of Philosophy, Dickinson College)

1:30-1:45  Eddy Nahmias (Dept. of Philosophy, Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University)

A Brief Introduction to Experimental Philosophy

1:45-2:15  Bertram Malle and Steve Guglielmo (Dept. of Psychology, University of Oregon)

The Knobe Artifact? Lessons in the Subtelties of Language

2:15-2:45  John Mikhail (Georgetown University Law Center and Dept. of Philosophy)

Intuitions of Negligence

2:45-3:15  Jonathan Baron (Dept. of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania)

Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgments

3:15-3:45  Liane Young (Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT)

Reading Minds for Moral Judgment: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach

3:45-4:00  Open Discussion

4:00-4:15  Coffee Break

4:15-4:45  Eric Schwitzgebel (Dept. of Philosophy, University of California-Riverside)

Introspection and Experiment

4:45-5:15  Brian Scholl (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

Two Kinds of Experimental Philosophy, and Their Methodological Dangers

5:15-5:45  Ron Mallon (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah)

Some Negative Thoughts on the Positive Program

5:45-6:15  Tania Lombrozo (Dept. of Psychology, University of California-Berkeley)

Experimental Methods for Thought Experiments

6:15-6:30  Open Discussion

Thursday, June 26, 9:00am-Noon

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<tr>
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Chair: Eddy Nahmias

8:00-9:00  Coffee, snacks, and conversation

9:00-9:30  Shaun Nichols (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Arizona)

The Folk Psychology of Consciousness

9:30-10:15 Joshua Knobe (Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Carolina) and

Edouard Machery (Dept. of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh)

Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness

10:15-11:00 Ernest Sosa (Dept. of Philosophy, Brown University, Rutgers University)

Some Critiques of Experimental Philosophy

11:00-11:30 Jonathan Weinberg (Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana University)

Defending Experimental Philosophy

11:30-12:00 Open Discussion
**CONFERENCE PROGRAM OVERVIEW**

**Thursday, June 26th**

10:30am-4:00pm  Conference Registration & Book Exhibit  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

1:30pm-4:30pm  Contributed Session A: Moral Psychology  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

Contributed Session B: Language & Mental Representation  
Ben Franklin Rm, Houston Hall

4:30pm-4:45pm  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

4:45pm-5:45pm  Stanton Prize Address: Laurie Santos  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

6:00pm-8:00pm  Poster Session I & Reception  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

**Friday, June 27th**

8:00am -4:00pm  Conference Registration & Continuing Book Exhibit  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

8:00am -8:30am  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

8:30am - 11:30am  Invited Symposium #1: Neuroethics  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

11:30am-12:30pm  Lunch Break  

12:30pm-3:30pm  Contributed Session C: Foundational Issues in Philosophy of Cognitive Science  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

Contributed Session D: Concepts and Categorization  
Ben Franklin Rm, Houston Hall

3:30pm-3:45pm  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

3:45pm-4:45pm  Invited Talk #1: Jerry Fodor  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

5:00pm-6:30pm  Poster Session II  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

**Saturday, June 28th**

8:00am-4:00pm  Conference Registration & Continuing Book Exhibit  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

8:00am-8:30am  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

8:30am-11:30am  Contributed Session E: Topics in Consciousness Studies  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

Contributed Session F: Theory of Mind  
Ben Franklin Rm, Houston Hall

11:30am-11:45am  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

11:45am-12:45pm  Invited Talk #2: Zenon Pylyshyn  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

12:45pm-2:15pm  Lunch Break  (Executive Committee Lunch Meeting)  

2:15pm-5:00pm  Invited Symposium #2: Addiction and Responsibility  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

5:00pm-5:15pm  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

5:15pm-6:15pm  Presidential Address: Lila R. Gleitman  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

7:00pm-10:00pm  Banquet  
The Inn at the University of Pennsylvania

**Sunday, June 29th**

8:30am-9:00am  Coffee & Continuing Book Exhibit till 2:00pm  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

9:00am-10:00am  Invited Talk #3: The Larry Erlbaum Lecture: Paul Rozin  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

10:00am-10:15am  Coffee Break  
Reading Room, Houston Hall

10:15am-12:15pm  Invited Symposium #3: Bayesian Inference and Rationality  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

12:15pm-1:30pm  Lunch and Business Meeting  
Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall
## CONFERENCE PROGRAM

### Thursday, June 26th

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<td><strong>Contributed Session A: Moral Psychology</strong></td>
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<td>Chair: Daniel M. Haybron (Dept. of Philosophy, St. Louis University)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dept. of Philosophy, Dickinson College)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Adam Feltz (Dept. of Philosophy, Florida State U)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>The Actor-Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: Edouard Machery (Dept. of History &amp; Philosophy of Science, Univ. of Pittsburgh)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Dominic P. Murphy (Dept. of Philosophy, California Institute of Technology)</td>
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<td><em>The Narrative Self, Cognitive Architecture and Moral Philosophy</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: Karsten R. Stueber (Dept. of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Felipe De Brigard (Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Carolina)</td>
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<td><em>If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: Valerie Tiberius (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Minnesota)</td>
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<td>1:30pm-4:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Contributed Session B: Language and Mental Representation</strong></td>
<td>Benjamin Franklin Room, Houston Hall</td>
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<td>Chair: Tamara Nicol Medina (IRCS, University of Pennsylvania)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Michael Devitt (Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY)</td>
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<td><em>The ‘Linguistic Conception’ of Grammars</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: Georges Rey (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maryland)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Evelina Fedorenko, Lillia Cherkasskiy, Steven Plantadosi, Jonathan Scholz, &amp; Rebecca Saxe (Dept. of Brain &amp; Cognitive Sciences, MIT)</td>
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<td><em>Speak Your Mind: Listeners’ Representations of the Speaker’s Thoughts Depend on Prosody</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: John Trueswell (IRCS, Univ. of Pennsylvania)</td>
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<td>Speaker: Louise Antony (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst)</td>
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<td><em>In Praise of Loose Talk: Three Kinds of Rule-Following in Cognitive Science</em></td>
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<td>Discussant: Steven Gross (Dept. of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University)</td>
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<td>4:30pm-4:45pm</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
<td>Reading Room, Houston Hall</td>
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<td>4:45pm-5:45pm</td>
<td><strong>Stanton Prize Address</strong></td>
<td>Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall</td>
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<td>Laurie R. Santos (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)</td>
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<td><em>The Evolution of Irrationality: Insights From Non-Human Primates</em></td>
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<td>Introduction by Colin Allen (President Elect, History &amp; Philosophy of Science, Indiana University)</td>
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<td>6:00pm-8:00pm</td>
<td><strong>Poster Session I &amp; Reception</strong></td>
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Friday, June 27th

8:00am - 8:30am  Coffee  Reading Room, Houston Hall
8:00am - 4:00pm  Conference Registration & Continuing Book Exhibit

8:30am - 11:30am  Invited Symposium #1: Neuroethics  Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

Martha Farah (Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania)
Chair: Persons and Things

Anjan Chatterjee (Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania)
Cosmetic Neurology

Kenneth R. Foster (Dept. of Bioengineering, University of Pennsylvania)
Brain-Computer Interfaces

Kenneth Norman (Dept. of Psychology, Princeton University)
Brain Reading

Erik Parens (The Hastings Center)
Ethics and Neuroethics

11:30am-12:30pm  Lunch Break

12:30pm-3:30pm  Contributed Session C: Foundational Issues in Philosophy of Cognitive Science  Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

Chair: Susan Schneider (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania)

12:30 Speaker: Michael L. Anderson (Dept. of Psychology, Franklin and Marshall College)
On the Functional Architecture of the Cortex: Empirical Evidence Against Modularity
Discussant: John Bickle (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati)

1:30 Speaker: Carlos A. Zednik (Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University)
Dynamic Models and Mechanistic Explanations
Discussant: Anthony P. Chemero (Dept. of Philosophy, Franklin & Marshall College)

2:30 Speaker: Charles Wallis (Dept. of Philosophy, California State University Long Beach)
Dual-Use Neural Systems and Theories of Mental Representation
Discussant: Gary Hatfield, Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania

12:30pm-3:30pm  Contributed Session D: Concepts and Categorization  Benjamin Franklin Room, Houston Hall

Chair: Andrew C. Connolly (Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania)

12:30 Speaker: Deena Weisberg (Yale University) and Michael Weisberg (Univ. of Pennsylvania)
The Death of Similarity?
Discussant: Christopher Gauker (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati)

1:30 Speaker: Barbara Malt and Michael Paquet (Dept. of Psychology, Lehigh University)
The Real Deal: What Judgments of “Really” Reveal About How People Think About Artifacts
Discussant: Lila Chrysikou (Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania)

2:30 Speaker: Daniel Weiskopf (Dept. of Philosophy, University of South Florida)
The Space of Concepts
Discussant: Sandeep Prasada (Dept. of Psychology, CUNY, Hunter College)
Friday, June 27th – Continued

3:30pm-3:45pm  **Coffee Break**  Reading Room, Houston Hall

3:45pm-4:45pm  **Invited Talk #1**  Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

  **Jerry Fodor** (Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University)
  
  *Did the Dodo Lose Its Ecological Niche? Or Was It the Other Way Around?*
  
  Introduction by **Georges Rey** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maryland)

5:00pm-6:30pm  **Poster Session II**  Reading Room, Houston Hall

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**Evening on Your Own in Philadelphia**

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Saturday, June 28th

8:00am - 8:30am  **Coffee**  Reading Room, Houston Hall
8:00am - 4:00pm  **Conference Registration & Continuing Book Exhibit**

8:30am-11:30am  **Contributed Session E: Topics in Consciousness Studies**  Bodek Lounge, Houston Hall

  Chair: **Guy Dove** (University of Louisville)

  8:30  Speaker: **Bryce Huebner** (Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University)
  
  *Is There a Commonsense Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness?*
  
  Discussant: **Joseph Levine** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

  9:30  Speaker: **Justin Sytsma** and Edouard Machery (Dept. of History & Philosophy of Science, Univ. of Pittsburgh)
  
  *Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience*
  
  Discussant: **Eric Schwitzgebel** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside)

  10:30  Speaker: **Kelly Trogdon** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
  
  *Experiential Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought*
  
  Discussant: **Casey O’Callaghan** (Dept. of Philosophy, Bates College)

8:30am-11:30am  **Contributed Session F: Theory of Mind**  Benjamin Franklin Room, Houston Hall

  Chair: **Robert A. Wilson** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Alberta)

  8:30  Speaker: **Peter Carruthers** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maryland)
  
  *Simulation and the First Person*
  
  Discussant: **Nicholas Georgalis** (Dept. of Philosophy, East Carolina University)

  9:30  Speaker: **Sarah Robins** (Dept of Philosophy, Washington University)
  
  *Simulation and Tacit Knowledge: What’s Really at Issue in the Folk Psychology Debate*
  
  Discussant: **William Ramsey** (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame)

  10:30  Speaker: **Bertram F. Malle** and Jess Holbrook (Dept. of Psychology, University of Oregon)
  
  *Is There a Hierarchy of Social Inference? Evidence From a New Experimental Paradigm*
  
  Discussant: **Tania Lombrozo** (Dept. of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley)
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<td>Invited Talk #2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zenon Pylyshyn</td>
<td>(Dept. of Psychology and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University)</td>
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<td><em>Tracking the Missing Link: Steps Towards Bridging the Mind-World Gap</em></td>
<td>Introduction by Brian Scholl (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)</td>
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<td>12:45pm-2:15pm</td>
<td>Lunch Break (Executive Committee Lunch Meeting)</td>
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<td>2:15pm-5:00pm</td>
<td>Invited Symposium #2: Addiction and Responsibility</td>
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<td>Jeffrey Poland</td>
<td>(Dept. of History, Philosophy, &amp; Social Science, Rhode Island School of Design)</td>
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<td><em>Chair: Multiple Perspectives on Addiction and Responsibility</em></td>
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<td>George Ainslie</td>
<td>(Dept. of Psychiatry, Coatesville Veterans Affairs Medical Center)</td>
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<td><em>‘Free Will’ as Recursive Self-Prediction: Does a Deterministic Mechanism Reduce Responsibility?</em></td>
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<td>Louis Charland</td>
<td>(Dept. of Philosophy and Psychiatry, University of Western Ontario)</td>
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<td><em>Decisional Capacity as a Framework for Understanding Responsibility in Addiction</em></td>
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<td>George Graham</td>
<td>(Dept. of Philosophy, Wake Forest University)</td>
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<td><em>Addiction and Responsibility for Self</em></td>
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<td>Owen Flanagan</td>
<td>(Dept. of Philosophy and Neurobiology, Duke University)</td>
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<td>Lila R. Gleitman</td>
<td>(President of SPP 2008; IRCS, University of Pennsylvania; CCS, Rutgers University)</td>
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<td><em>Fearful Symmetry: ‘Similar’ and Similar Concepts</em></td>
<td>Introduction by Colin Allen (President Elect; History &amp; Philosophy of Science, Indiana University)</td>
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<td>7:00pm-10:00pm</td>
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<td>9:00am-10:00am</td>
<td><strong>Invited Talk #3, The Larry Erlbaum Lecture</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Paul Rozin</strong> (Dept. of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania)</td>
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<td><em>Modern Academic Psychology: Fads and Holes</em></td>
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<td>Introduction by <strong>Lila R. Gleitman</strong> (IRCS, University of Pennsylvania, CCS, Rutgers University)</td>
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<td>10:15am-12:15pm</td>
<td><strong>Invited Symposium #3: Bayesian Inference and Rationality</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fei Xu</strong> (Dept. of Psychology, University of British Columbia)</td>
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<td><em>Chair: Rational Statistical Inference in Cognitive Development</em></td>
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<td><strong>David Danks</strong> (Dept. of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University)</td>
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<td><em>What Bayesian Models Can (and Can’t) Tell Us About Cognition</em></td>
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<td><strong>Christopher Meacham</strong> (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst)</td>
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<td><em>Defining Belief and Desire</em></td>
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<td><strong>Michael Strevens</strong> (Dept. of Philosophy, New York University)</td>
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<td>12:15pm-1:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Lunch and Business Meeting</strong></td>
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**End of Conference**
#1 Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation
Craig Roxborough and Jill Cumby (York University)

#2 The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action
Andrei Buckareff and Jing Zhu (Marist College)

#3 Is Animal Perception a Buzzing Blooming Confusion? Against the Impossibility of Animal Perception in McDowell's Mind and World
Jorge Morales (UNAM - The National University of Mexico)

#4 Mimesis and Mirror Neurons: Evolutionary Steps in the Development of Human Language
Robert Peacock (University of Guelph)

#5 A Massive Confusion in Massive Modularity
Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)

#6 The Broad Perception Model and Introspecting Qualia
Renee Smith (Coastal Carolina University)

#7 Is Attention The Mechanism Of Consciousness?
Felipe De Brigard and Jesse Prinz (UNC Chapel Hill)

#8 Do Political Scientists Vote More Often? Do Ethicists?
Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust (UC Riverside)

#9 Blindness Does Not Lead to Mind-Blindness: an fMRI Investigation of Theory of Mind in the Congenitally Blind
Marina Bedny (Harvard Medical Sch), Lucy Chen (MIT), Alvaro Pascual-Leone (Harvard Medical Sch), and Rebecca Saxe (MIT)

#10 Neural Representation and Intentionality
Mike Collins (CUNY Graduate Center)

#11 Moving Towards Reconciliation: A Multi-Level Connectionist Modeling of Intuition and Implications for Unconscious Emotional Affect, Implicit Memory and Moral Epistemology
J. R. Kuntz (University of Tennessee)

#12 Minding Kinds and Kinding Minds: How Should Psychological Entities Be Classified?
Charles Starkey (Clemson University)

#13 Can Babies Read Minds?
Serife Tekin (York University)

#14 Locating Conscious Qualities in Logical Space
Jennifer Matey (Florida International University)

#15 Metabolic and Cognitive Information Processing
Carlos Montemayor (Rutgers University)

#16 The Role of Moral Theories in Moral Judgment
Tania Lombrozo (University of California Berkeley)

#17 Unstable Intuitions and Need for Cognition: How Being Thoughtful Sometimes Just Means Being Wrong in a Different Way
Jonathan Weinberg, Joshua Alexander and Chad Gonnerman (Indiana University)

#18 On Representing Objects With a Language of Sentience
Brian P. Keane (UCLA)

#19 Control-Theoretic Models of Action Understanding: Simulation, Theory, or Both?
Mitchell Herschbach (UC San Diego)

#20 One Small Step for Animal Metacognition
Justin Couchman (SUNY Buffalo)

#21 Extended Phenomenology-Cognition
Anthony Chemero and Michael Silberstein (Franklin and Marshall College)

#22 Lack of Responsibility? Reasons-Responsiveness Theory and the Situationist Challenge
Ta-Lun (Linus) Huang (UC Riverside)

#23 Blindsight and Multiple Object Tracking: A Possible Glimpse into the Functioning of Visual Indexing Theory
James Reed-Jones and Don Dedrick (University of Guelph)

#24 Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Experimental Studies
C. Daryl Cameron and B. Keith Payne (UNC Chapel Hill)

#25 Reporting Awareness
Mike Bruno and Benjamin Kozuch (University of Arizona)

#26 What Psychophysics Teaches us About Dretske's "What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness".
Steven J. Todd (University of Connecticut)

#27 Norms Without Feelings
Dieneke (A.A.) Hubbeling (University of East London)
#1 Shell Games, Information and Counterfactuals
Andrea Scarantino (Georgia State University)

#2 Cognitive Evidence Against Shapiro's Epistemic Account
Luke Jerzykiewicz (Clark University)

#3 Neuroethical Considerations Regarding Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
Chuck Stieg (University of Minnesota)

#4 The Duck/Rabbit Illusion: Re-examination of Information Encapsulation
Aysu Suben, Michael L. Anderson and Tony Chemero (Franklin and Marshall College)

#5 Analog and Digital Representation
Matthew Katz (University of Pennsylvania)

#6 Are Linguists Better Subjects?
Jennifer Culbertson and Steven Gross (Johns Hopkins University)

#7 Supervenience, Properties and Mental Causation
Anthony Dardis (Hofstra University)

#8 The Role of Intention in Teleological Explanations
Jane Erickson and Frank Keil (Yale University)

#9 Responsibility, Blame, and the Belief in a Good World
Eric Mandelbaum, David Ripley and Felipe De Brigard (UNC Chapel Hill)

#10 Only Intellectuals are Anti-Intellectuals
Ram Neta and Mark Phelan (UNC Chapel Hill)

#11 Why Craver's Mechanisms Aren't Useful for Psychology
Holly Andersen (University of Pittsburgh)

#12 Aspects of a Fully Psychological Theory of Sortal Representations
Sandeep Prasada (Hunter College, CUNY)

#13 More Than Meets the Eye?
Franklin Scott (University of Connecticut)

#14 Remembering Beliefs
Kate Devitt (Rutgers University)

#15 Exemplar Retrieval in Conceptual Combination
Lisa G. Lederer (University of Pittsburgh)

#16 The Extension of 'Mind'
J. Brendan Ritchie (University of Maryland College Park)

#17 Does Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation Undermine Epiphenomenalism?
Benjamin Kozuch (University of Arizona)

#18 Outcomes Dominate Intentions in a "Trembling Hand" Game
Fiery Cushman (Harvard University)

#19 Levels and the Relationship Between Psychology and Neurobiology
Gregory Johnson (Drexel University)

#20 Sex Differences in Moral Interests: The Role of Kinship and the Nature of Reciprocity
Deborah Mower (Youngstown State University)

#21 The Neuroscience of Well-Being
Adam Shriver (Washington University)

#22 The Evolution of Causal Understanding? Causal Understanding Influences Rhesus Monkeys' (Macaca Mulatta) Exploratory Play
Brian J. Edwards, Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz and Laurie R. Santos (Yale University)

#23 An Empirical Constraint on the Pragmatic Theory of Explanation
Alexandra Bradner and Seth Chin-Parker (Denison University)

#24 How Smart Languages Learn to Teach Themselves to Stupid Children
Justin Fisher (University of British Columbia)

#25 Extension, Exculpation and Excuses: Extended Cognition and Moral Responsibility
Mason Cash (University of Central Florida)

#26 Language, Thought, Logic, and Existence
Richard Brown (CUNY La Guardia College)
The Actor-Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire
Thomas Nadelhoffer and Adam Feltz

In this paper, we first provide an overview of what Walter Sinnott-Armstrong calls the Master Argument against moral intuitionism. Then we examine some of the literature on framing effects—especially as it pertains to moral philosophy. Finally, we present the results of a new study which create yet another hurdle intuitionists must clear. It appears that in addition to being influenced by framing effects, our moral intuitions are also influenced by an actor-observer bias as well—a bias whereby we hold other people to different moral standards than we would hold ourselves even if we were in the same situation.

The Narrative Self, Cognitive Architecture and Moral Psychology
Dominic Murphy

Many philosophers and psychologists believe some version of a narrative thesis about the self. The thesis is sometimes put as the claim that the self just is, or is constituted by a narrative. In other cases, scholars discuss the narrative as a self-representation. I examine two philosophical projects which exploit this general idea. I call them ersatz Cartesianism and ersatz Kantianism. They use narrative to naturalize the self, thereby avoiding the suspect metaphysics of full-blooded Cartesianism or Kantianism. I confront these philosophical projects with some empirical findings, to suggest that the narrative ideal of self-representation cannot give ersatz Kantians what they want, but some modest version of the view may suffice for ersatz Cartesianism.

If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?
Felipe De Brigard

In this paper I present some experimental evidence suggesting that the "experience machine" thought-experiment may not isolate the intuition Nozick wanted to isolate. In addition, I present an explanatory model, derived from what behavioral economists and psychologists call the “status quo bias,” in order to account for these results.

The "Linguistic Conception" of Grammars
Michael Devitt

The received Chomskian view is that a grammar is about the language faculty. In contrast to this “psychological conception,” I argue In Ignorance of Language for a “linguistic conception.” The present paper aims to strengthen the case for this conception. It argues that there is a theoretically interesting linguistic reality external to the mind. Grammars give a rich picture of linguistic reality but only a relatively impoverished picture of psychological reality. In defending this position, I continue my debate with Georges Rey over “linguistic realism.”

Speak Your Mind: Listeners’ Representations of the Speaker’s Thoughts Depend on Prosody
Evelina Fedorenko, Lillia Cherkasskiy, Steven Plantadosi, Jonathan Scholz and Rebecca Saxe

Does understanding other people's assertions obligatorily involve considering their mental states? We propose that it does not. Even when the speaker explicitly uses a propositional attitude form (“I think”), alternative prosodic contours change the focus of the assertion, such that only sometimes the focus is on representing the speaker’s beliefs. Listeners should be more likely to explicitly represent the speaker’s beliefs in cases where an element of the propositional attitude frame (either I or think) is stressed. We investigated this hypothesis in behavioural and fMRI experiments.

In Praise of Loose Talk: Three Kinds of Rule-Following in Cognitive Science
Louise Antony

This paper is aimed at reconciling philosophers who want cognitive scientists to clarify their foundations with cognitive scientists who say all will be revealed as empirical work progresses. On the one hand, I'll argue that empirical inquiry need not wait for the clarification of its foundations, and that empirical scientists should not be pressed to define terms that are serving their needs perfectly well. On the other hand, I'll offer some philosophical clarification—a taxonomy of “rule-following” cognitive systems: rational-causal, intelligible-causal, and brute-causal.
**On the Functional Architecture of the Cortex: Empirical Evidence Against Modularity**

**Michael Anderson**

The talk outlines some of the broad architectural implications of the modularity thesis, and reports on an attempt to test for them. The method involved analyzing 472 fMRI experiments in 8 cognitive domains, to discover which brain regions cooperated with which others, under what conditions. The results indicate that the same brain regions contribute to functions across various cognitive domains, but in each domain cooperate with one another in different patterns. This does not appear to be compatible with the modularity thesis. Implications of the finding for the best approach to analyzing and modeling cognitive functions will also be discussed.

**Dynamical Models & Mechanistic Explanations**

**Carlos A. Zednik**

Philosophers of science increasingly believe that cognitive phenomena are explained by describing the mechanisms that produce those phenomena, rather than by subsuming them under laws. With respect to the increasingly influential dynamical approach to cognition, however, it has been claimed that only certain ‘hybrid’ dynamical models (in particular, connectionist dynamical models) satisfy the requirements for mechanistic explanation. This paper evaluates this claim. In particular, it is argued that in the field of evolutionary robotics, a number of ‘pure’ (i.e. non-connectionist) dynamical models have been developed that provide mechanistic explanations of ‘minimally cognitive’ phenomena.

**Dual-Use Neural Systems and Theories of Mental Representation**

**Charles Wallis**

A tacit assumption—“the univocality assumption” (UA)--and an explicit argument—the “Stich-Fodor argument” (SFA)—constrain theories of mental representation. UA requires representational theories assign univocal, task-independent contents to mental states. SFA concludes that functional role semantics lacks a non-arbitrary content-relevant/content-irrelevant demarcation for functional roles. Systems like the ventral visual pathway and the mirror neuron system function as “dual-use systems,” performing distinct but relatively isomorphic tasks involving different objects, properties, and/or events represented with identical neuronal resources—contradicting UA. Brains mediate between dual-use contents via task-specific, non-arbitrary functional roles. SFA proves unsound.

**The Death of Similarity?**

**Deena Weisberg and Michael Weisberg**

Similarity is fundamental for everyday interactions and for scientific reasoning. But influential arguments from W. V. O. Quine and Nelson Goodman have persuaded philosophers that this concept is logically bankrupt. Despite their knowledge of these arguments, several psychologists have developed promising context-dependent theories of similarity, most notably Amos Tversky. Although Goodman found context-dependence to be an unacceptable solution, we review empirical results showing that context plays a major role in real-world similarity judgments and that context-dependent processes allow for fruitful similarity judgments in scientific domains, even in the absence of a fully general similarity metric.

**The Real Deal: What Judgments of “Really” Reveal About How People Think About Artifacts**

**Barbara Malt and Michael Paquet**

In two experiments we investigate what drives judgments of what an artifact really is and what these judgments reveal about how people think about artifacts. We contrast an essentialist perspective with a pragmatics perspective. Results from both experiments favor the pragmatics perspective that judgments of “really” reflect how well properties of the object match properties evoked by the name in question.

**The Space of Concepts**

**Daniel Weiskopf**

While explanations in cognitive science often rely on a distinction between conceptual and perceptual representations, explaining this distinction has proven difficult. I argue that the distinction is not to be drawn in terms of format or content, but rather should be explained in functional terms. The functional distinction between percepts and concepts lies in the fact that concepts are subject to a set of inferential dispositions that treat them as partial, fallible ways of capturing information about an object or category. This openness to revision and correction characterizes the space of concepts, as distinct from the space of perceptions.
Is There a Commonsense Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness?

Bryce Huebner

It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that experimental data concerning the ascription of mental states suggests that disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided; they all fail to capture the interesting and subtle differences between our ascriptions of pain and our ascriptions of emotion.

Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience

Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they don’t and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to affectivity. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.

Experiential Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought

Kelly Trogdon

When you attend to the phenomenal character of a current experience, you instantiate a particular cognitive relation to that experience, what I call the “acquaintance” relation. Acquaintance has two central features, what I call its “directness” and “robustness”. In this talk I consider an account of acquaintance according to which our phenomenal concepts are demonstrative in nature. I argue that the demonstrative approach fails to show how acquaintance can be both direct and robust. I conclude by setting out a puzzle concerning the two faces of phenomenal thought, its directness and robustness, independent of the details of the demonstrative approach.

Simulation and the First Person

Peter Carruthers

This article focuses on, and critiques, Alvin Goldman’s (2006) view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.

Simulation and Tacit Knowledge: What's Really at Issue in the Folk Psychology Debate

Sarah Robins

I argue in favor of the view that Goldman’s simulationist account of folk psychology collapses into a version of theory-theory. Davies and Stone (2001) have attempted to defend Goldman’s view, but I claim that their defense is not in accordance with Goldman’s own formulation, and further, offers an inadequate characterization of the practical reasoning involved in folk psychology. What Davies and Stone’s response shows is not the continued viability of the theory versus simulation debate, but rather that the real issue in characterizing folk psychology is how to account for our ability to have tacit knowledge involving propositional attitudes.

Is There a Hierarchy of Social Inference? Evidence from a New Experimental Paradigm

Bertram Malle and Jess Holbrook

Previous research in human social cognition has examined multiple social inferences—about intentionality, desires, beliefs and personality—but these inferences have always been studied in isolation. In reality, they occur simultaneously, so the question arises whether there is a hierarchy of social inferences. In a new experimental paradigm, we examined how frequently and how fast such inferences are made and to what extent they facilitate or compete with one another. Using both verbal and visual behavior stimuli, we found consistent evidence for at least a partial hierarchy, with intentionality and goal inferences being easier and faster than inferences about beliefs and personality.