

Society for Philosophy and Psychology



39th Meeting
12-15 June 2013
Brown University

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Bertram Malle

The Society for Philosophy and Psychology is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable organization.

39th Meeting Society for Philosophy and Psychology

12-15 June 2013
Brown University

WELCOME!

Welcome to the campus of Brown University for the 39th meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology. An excellent program has been assembled by the program chairs: Carrie Figdor (Philosophy, University of Iowa) and Eranda Jayawickreme (Psychology, Wake Forest University).

Along with SPP, the conference is made possible by the generous support of Brown University.

In addition to those mentioned above, thanks go to all who refereed papers for the conference or served on the prize committees. Special votes of thanks are owed to SPP Information Officer Michael Anderson, Stanton Prize Coordinator Joshua Greene, all the members of the Executive Committee of SPP, and especially Secretary/Treasurer Tom Polger, who ensures Society of Philosophy and Psychology's continuous health.

We hope that you will be able to explore the Brown University campus and the city of Providence during your stay. Our extended conference guide contains information about important campus locations, a few city highlights, and plenty of information about the excellent food culture in Providence.

We hope that you will join us at SPP again next year for its 40th anniversary meeting, in Vancouver, British Columbia (dates TBA).

Michael Devitt, SPP President
Bertram Malle, Local Host
Providence, June 2013

GENERAL INFORMATION

On-Site Contact

For questions that arise at the conference, please contact Bertram Malle <bfmalle@brown.edu>. In the case of *emergencies*, please call (401) 863-4111.

Registration

Registration starts at 8:15 a.m. on Thursday in MacMillan Lobby, continuing until 4 p.m. daily.

Locations

All presentations will be held in MacMillan Hall (167 Thayer Street), as will publisher exhibits, breakfast snacks, and coffee breaks. The paper swap on opening night and the two poster sessions (Thursday and Friday) will take place in Sayles Hall, a brief walk from MacMillan. A tailored Google Map with all the major conference locations as well as a large number of restaurants, bars, and so on is available at <http://bit.ly/spp2013>. An extensive narrative *Conference Guide* (with more information about locations and food options) is available on the SPP conference website.

Transportation

The dorm rooms are a 4 min walk from MacMillan Hall. The featured conference hotels are a more demanding walk from MacMillan (15 min for the Hampton Inn, 17 min for the Biltmore, 22 min for the Wyndham). The hotels have shuttles, but we also offer **Conference Shuttles**:

Thursday, June 13th and Friday, June 14th
8:00am-9:30am, 8:00pm-9:30pm

Saturday, June 15th
8:00am-9:30am, 7:00pm-8:30pm

Taxis are easy to get from the Biltmore and other hotels. You can also call taxis at *American Cab*, (401) 487-2111, *My Taxi* (401) 626-9432, or *East Side Taxi*, (401) 521-4200.

Food and Thought

On opening night, Wednesday, we will have an inaugural Paper Swap, accompanied by an offering of Italian cold cuts and vegetables as well as a ticket-based cash bar (see alcohol policies below). After Poster Madness on Thursday we will walk over to Sayles Hall for the first poster session, with a modest buffet of classic New England foods and a bar. Same on Friday, but with a buffet of Asian selections. Saturday after the President's address, the banquet at the Biltmore will begin at 7:45 with appetizers, seafood, and several carving and serving stations. At the bar, the first two drinks are free.

Information for Chairs and Speakers

Each contributed session consists of 3 to 5 papers of either 30 minutes in length (Long-Form) or 15 minutes in length (Short-Form). Sessions 1a and 1b are all Long-Form; sessions 4A and 4B are all Short-Form; the remaining sessions (2A-B, 3A-B, 5A-B) have two Long-Form presentations followed by 3 Short-Form presentations. Each Long-Form presentation has 10 minutes of response time, which individual speakers have allocated to either all audience Q&A or to 5 minutes of commentary and 5 minutes of audience Q&A. Chairs will strictly enforce the total time allotted to each speaker, will follow the order of presentations listed in the program, and will keep transition time between papers to less than 5 minutes.

If you are planning to use your Mac to project your presentation, you will need to *bring your own adapters*. The lecture halls supply only adapters for PCs.

Information about Posters

Poster presenters may install their posters on Thursday/Friday starting at 1 p.m. in Sayles Hall. The recommended installation method on the fabric-covered boards is with thumb tacks. The maximally available area for each poster is 8ft wide by 4 ft high. At least one author should always tend the poster during the session period of 7:45-9:00 p.m.

The presenting author or other designated presenter should be at the poster during the times specified on the program.

Information about the **SPP Poster Prize** will be distributed at Poster Madness.

Poster Madness

On Thursday at 6:45-7:45 p.m., Poster Madness will take place. Each poster presenter will have the opportunity to give a 50-second précis of their poster. The goal is to entice the audience to go see your poster—offer a taste of your argument or findings, show your most beautiful graph, or tell a joke. All poster presenters are limited to using *a single slide* and must submit it to Steven Horst <shorst@wesleyan.edu>, the Madster of Ceremony, who will load all the slides onto the laptop in advance.

Paper Swap

This year's SPP marks the initiation of an additional presentation format: an informal paper session or "paper swap." This session will be held in tandem with the opening reception on the evening of Wednesday, June 12th. Paper-swap participants convene in Sayles Hall, where SPP attendees can engage with them in conversation about the presented work, receive paper copies, or sign up for emailed copies. There will be tables along the wall, marked with spaces for each paper presenter. Light refreshments and a cash bar will be available.

Paper swap presenters must bring their own paper copies and/or sign-up system.

Book and Publisher Exhibit

Exhibits are held during conference hours in the MacMillan Lobby.

Alcohol

All visitors are subject to Brown University alcohol policies. For example, walking across campus with alcoholic beverages is prohibited. Further, a minimum age of 21 at events that serve alcohol (opening reception, poster sessions, banquet).

For cost and legal reasons, alcohol will be served at the opening reception and the two poster receptions in exchange for tickets, which must be purchased at a table approximately 7.5 feet from the bar (which has the words DON'T PANIC inscribed in large friendly letters).

Internet Access

Wireless internet access (WiFi) will be available to conference attendees on Brown campus. Simply connect to the Brown-Guest network and log in with your Email address.

Campus Public Safety Office: 75 Charlesfield Street

Emergency Number: (401) 863-4111

Health Services: (401) 863-1330 for 24 hour Nursing advice.

Program of the 39th Meeting Society for Philosophy and Psychology

12-15 June 2013
Brown University

Lectures, Contributed Sessions, and Poster Madness are held at **MacMillan Hall, 167 Thayer Street**. The Paper Swap on Wednesday evening and Poster Presentations on Thursday and Friday evening take place in **Sayles Hall**, a 4-minute walk from MacMillan.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12

7:45-9:00 pm PAPER SWAP
LIGHT RECEPTION AND CASH BAR

SAYLES HALL

THURSDAY, JUNE 13

8:30-9:00 REGISTRATION, COFFEE, AND BOOK DISPLAY MACMILLAN LOBBY

9:00-10:15 Invited Lecture MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Sponsored by the Brown University Colver Lectureship

Chair: *Joshua Knobe (Yale)*

Susan Fiske (Princeton):

Varieties of (De)Humanization: Separated by Competition and Status

**10:30-1:00 Contributed Session 1A:
Methods, Models and Mechanisms** MACMILLAN 115

Session chair: *Zoe Jenkin (CUNY Graduate Center)*

Catherine Driscoll (North Carolina State): Neither Adaptive Thinking Nor
Reverse Engineering: Methods in the Evolutionary Social Sciences

Maurice Lamb (Cincinnati) and Anthony Chemero (Cincinnati): Understanding
Dynamical Models

Commentator: *Kari Theurer (Trinity College)*

Lena Kästner (Ruhr – Bochum): Mechanistic Explanation and Interlevel
Manipulation

Commentator: *John Bickle (Mississippi State)*

- 10:30-1:00 Contributed Session 1B:
Well-Being and Social Cognition** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Session chair: *Deena Skolnick Weisburg (Temple)*
Michael Brownstein (New Jersey Institute of Technology): Implicit Bias, Context, and Character
Commentator: *Asia Ferrin (U. of Washington)*
Erik G. Helzer (Wake Forest), R. Michael Furr (Wake Forest) and William Fleeson (Wake Forest): Visible Virtues: Self/Other Agreement in the Perception of Moral Character
Commentator: *Heidi Maibom (Carleton)*
Erik Angner (George Mason): Subjective Well-Being
Commentator: *Jennifer Hawkins (Duke)*
- 1:00-2:15 LUNCH** (ON YOUR OWN)
- 2:30-3:45 Stanton Prize Address** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Chair: *Michael Devitt (CUNY Graduate Center)*
Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh):
Bem, Stapel, Etc.: What's Wrong With Psychology? And What's To Be Done About It?
- 3:45-4:00 COFFEE BREAK** MACMILLAN LOBBY
- 4:00-6:30 Contributed Session 2A:
Cognitive Neuroscience** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Session chair: *Brian Keeley (Pitzer College)*
Vincent Abruzzo (Massachusetts – Amherst): Grounding Self-Knowledge in the Brain's Modal Systems
Commentator: *Matt Bateman (Franklin & Marshall)*
Maria Brincker (Massachusetts – Boston): The Aesthetic Stance: On the Conditions and Consequences of Becoming a Beholder
Commentator: *Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse)*
Chaohui Guo (Zurich), Sunhae Sul (Korea), Nora Heinzelmann (Oxford), Christian Ruff (Zurich) and Ernst Fehr (Zurich): A TMS Investigation Into the Role of rTPJ in Donation Behavior
John Michael (Copenhagen), Kristian Sandberg (Aarhus), Josh Skewes (Aarhus), Thomas Wolf (Vienna), Jakob Blicher (Aarhus), Morten Overgaard (Aarhus) and Chris Frith (Wellcome Trust): TMS (cTBS) Demonstrates a Causal Role of Premotor Homunculus in Action Interpretation
Jorie Koster-Hale (MIT), Marina Bedny (MIT) and Rebecca Saxe (MIT):
Thinking About Seeing: Perceptual Sources Of Knowledge ARE Encoded Similarly in the Mentalizing Regions of Sighted and Blind Adults

- 4:00-6:30 Contributed Session 2B:
Human Nature** MACMILLAN 115
- Session chair: *Serife Tekin (Pittsburgh)*
- Hisashi Nakao (Nagoya) and Kristin Andrews (York): Ready to Learn: A Critique of the Theory of Natural Pedagogy*
- Linus Ta-Lun Huang (Sydney): The Nativist Input Problem*
Commentator: Colin Allen (Indiana)
- Christina Starman (Yale) and Ori Friedman (Waterloo): Why People Aren't Property: Ownership and Personhood*
- Nina Strohminger (Duke) and Shaun Nichols (Arizona): The Essential Moral Self*
- Yoram Hazony (Institute for Advanced Studies, Shalem Center): A Solution to the Problem of Basic Emotions*
- 6:45-7:45 Poster Madness** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
- Madster of Ceremony:** *Stephen Horst (Wesleyan)*
- 7:45-9:00 Poster Session 1** SAYLES HALL
- RECEPTION AND CASH BAR

FRIDAY, JUNE 14

- 8:00-8:30 REGISTRATION, COFFEE, AND BOOK DISPLAY** MACMILLAN LOBBY
- 9:00-11:30 Contributed Session 3A:
Moral Psychology** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
- Session chair: *Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State)*
- Kurt Gray (UNC – Chapel Hill), Chelsea Schein (UNC – Chapel Hill) and Adrian Ward (Harvard): The Harm Hypothesis: Moral Judgment is Unified by a Dyadic Template of Perceived Harm*
- Yujia Song (UNC – Chapel Hill): Empathy, Proper Empathy, and Understanding*
Commentator: *David Pizarro (Cornell)*
- Dan Demetriou (Minnesota – Morris): Authority vs. Honor: A Crucial Distinction for Moral Science*
- Rachel Fedock (CUNY Graduate Center): Care as a Sentiment: The Emotions of Caring About*
- Mark Alicke (Ohio) and David Rose (Rutgers): When Intentions Go Awry*
- 9:00-11:30 Contributed Session 3B:
Perception and Perceptual Content** MACMILLAN 115
- Session chair: *Sean Allen-Hermanson (Florida International)*
- Chaz Firestone (Yale) and Brian Scholl (Yale): "Top-Down" Effects Where None Should be Found: The 'El Greco' fallacy in perception research*

David Bennett (Brown) and Jeremy Goodman (Oxford): Measuring up the World in Size and Distance Perception
Steven Gross (Johns Hopkins): Is Temporal Representation Constitutively Necessary for Perception?
Blake Thompson (Virginia Tech): Certainty and Uncertainty Revisited: Color as a Psycho-Biological Property
Steven Yamamoto (Brown): Two Doubts About the Way We See Affordances

11:45-1:00 Invited Lecture MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)

Chair: *Louise Antony (Massachusetts - Amherst)*

Sandra Upson, Managing Editor of *Scientific American MIND*
 Cognitive Science on Deadline: Context, Ethics and Error in Science Journalism

1:00-2:15 LUNCH (ON YOUR OWN)

1:30-2:15 SPECIAL SESSION: Funding Opportunities at the MACMILLAN 115
 Office of Naval Research Cognitive Science Program

2:30-3:45 Contributed Session 4A: MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Cognitive Science in Public Policy

Session chair: *Ayca Mazman (Cincinnati)*

Camillia Kong (Essex): Status Rather than Function in Capacity Assessments:
 The case of Re E

Toni Adleberg (Georgia State), Morgan Thompson (Georgia State) and Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State): Women and Philosophy: Why is it “Goodbye” at “Hello”?

Justin Landy (Pennsylvania) and Geoffrey Goodwin (Pennsylvania): Valuing Different Human Lives

Matthew Stewart (Simmons College): Witnessing Horror: Psychoanalysis and the Abject Horror of Lynching Photography

2:30-3:45 Contributed Session 4B: MACMILLAN 115
Cognition, Belief and Knowledge

Session chair: *David Winchell (Washington U. in St. Louis)*

Wesley Buckwalter (Waterloo), David Rose (Rutgers) and John Turri (Waterloo): Belief Though Thick and Thin

Derek Powell (UCLA), Zachary Horne (Illinois – Urbana-Champaign), Angel Pinillos (Arizona State) and Keith Holyoak (UCLA): Justified True Belief Triggers False Recall of ‘Knowing’

John Turri (Waterloo) and Ori Friedman (Waterloo): The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Felipe de Brigard (Harvard), Karl Szpunar (Harvard) and Daniel Schacter (Harvard): Coming to Grips with the Past: Effect of Repeated Simulation on the Perceived Plausibility of Episodic Counterfactual Thoughts

3:45-4:00	COFFEE BREAK	MACMILLAN LOBBY
4:00-6:30	Invited Symposium: The Nature of Character Session chair: <i>David Pizarro (Cornell)</i> <i>William Fleeson (Wake Forest)</i> Whole Trait Theory: A Model of Broad, Powerful Character Traits That is Based on Situation Effects <i>Nancy Snow (Marquette)</i> Situationism and Character: Challenges and Responses <i>Nomy Arpaly (Brown)</i> Virtues, Desires and Character Traits <i>Geoffrey Goodwin (Pennsylvania)</i> Moral Character Predominates in Person Perception and Evaluation	MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
6:45-7:45	New Directions 1: Person Perception Session chair: <i>Jonathan Phillips (Yale)</i> <i>Lee Jussim (Rutgers):</i> Conservatives as Canaries in the Coal Mine: Symptom of Sickness Sapping Scientific Social Psychology <i>Simine Vazire (Washington University in St. Louis):</i> Facing Our Selves: Life at the Border of Self-Deception and Self-Awareness	MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
6:45-7:45	New Directions 2: Metaphysics and Cognition Session chair: <i>David Sanford (Duke)</i> <i>L. A. Paul (UNC – Chapel Hill):</i> Understanding the Manifest: Metaphysics and Cognitive Science <i>Alyssa Ney (Rochester):</i> Grounding and Ontological Dependence in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense	MACMILLAN 115
7:45-9:00	Poster Session 2 RECEPTION AND CASH BAR	SAYLES HALL

SATURDAY, JUNE 15

- 8:30-9:00** **REGISTRATION, COFFEE, AND BOOK DISPLAY** MACMILLAN LOBBY
- 9:00-10:15** **Invited Lecture** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Sponsored by the Brown University Colver Lectureship
Chair: *Stephen Stich (Rutgers)*
Daniel C. Dennett (Tufts – Center for Cognitive Studies): The Role of Cultural Evolution in Making Our Minds
- 10:30-1:00** **Contributed Session 5A:
Language and Concepts** MACMILLAN 115
Session chair: *Lisa Miracchi (Rutgers)*
Kent Johnson (UC – Irvine): Notational Variants and Invariance in Linguistics
Collin Rice (Pittsburgh): Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids
Elinor Amit (Harvard), Cheryl Wakslak (USC) and Yaacov Trope (NYU): How Distance Affects the Use of Visual and Verbal Means of Communication
Arber Tasimi (Yale), Susan Gelman (Michigan), Joshua Knobe (Yale) and Andrei Cimpian (Illinois – Urbana-Champaign): Of Merts and Men: The role of domain and valence in generalizations
Jake Quilty-Dunn (CUNY Graduate Center): Problems for the Indeterminacy of Translation
- 10:30-1:00** **Contributed Session 5B:
Consciousness and Attention** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Session chair: *Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State)*
Christopher Hill (Brown) and David Bennett (Brown): A Multiple Relations Account of the Unity of Experience
Commentator: *Elizabeth Schechter (Washington U. in St. Louis)*
Worth Boone (Pittsburgh): Range Content, Attention and the Precision of Representation
Commentator: *Robert Howell (SMU)*
Joshua Shepherd (Florida State): The Experience of Trying
Valerie Hardcastle (Cincinnati): Radical Embodied Cognition and the Problem of Consciousness
Robert Foley (University College Dublin): The Complex Action Criterion of Consciousness
- 1:00-2:15** **LUNCH AND SPP BUSINESS MEETING** MACMILLAN 115
- 2:30-5:00** **Invited Symposium:
Language in Context** MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
Chair: *Karsten Stueber (Holy Cross)*

Stephen Neale (CUNY Graduate Center):

The Mythology of Context

Deirdre Wilson (University College London and Oslo – Center for the Study of Mind in Nature):

Beyond Speaker's Meaning

Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown):

Expert Communities and the Pragmatics of Peripheral Speech

Robin Clark (Pennsylvania):

Evolutionary Pragmatics

5:00-5:30	COFFEE BREAK	MACMILLAN LOBBY
5:30-5:45	Felicitation of Mary Whiton Calkins Chair: <i>Alan Leslie (Rutgers)</i> <i>Peggy DesAutels (Dayton)</i>	MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)
5:45-7:15	Presidential Address Chair: <i>Alan Leslie (Rutgers)</i> <i>Michael Devitt (CUNY Graduate Center):</i> Testing Theories of Reference	MACMILLAN 117 (Auditorium)

POSTER SESSIONS

Session 1: Thursday, June 13

SAYLES HALL

Allen-Hermanson, Sean: Development of Eye Morphology Relevant to Gaze Cuing in the Human Infant

Burnston, Daniel: Re-Cognizing Perception and Cognition

Cheon, Hyundeuk: Experimental Semantics About Natural Kind Terms: An East Asian Perspective

Chernyak, Nadia and Tamar Kushnir: The Importance of Choice for Moral Behavior: Giving Preschoolers Choice Increasing Sharing Behavior

Dabbagh, Hossein: Neuroethics Without Moral Intuitions? Reply to Peter Singer, Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene

Dacey, Mike: Association as a Semantic Level Construct

Dunlop, Katherine: Gareth Evans on Molyneux's Problem

Erb, Christopher and Fiery Cushman: Representing Process in Cases of Double Prevention

Fisher, Matthew, Joshua Knobe, Brent Strickland and Frank Keil: The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions About Objectivism and Subjectivism

Foley, Robert: The Complex Action Criterion for Consciousness

Huber, Tobias A.: Explanation in Neuroscience: Causal Mechanisms vs. Dynamical Models?

Humeny, Courtney and Casandra Bushey: The Role of Anger and Disgust in Intuitions About Health Behaviors

Irving, Zachary: I Wander About that Task: Why Mind-Wandering is Not Task-Unrelated Thought

Jenkin, Zoe: Intramodular Effects and Epistemic Downgrade

Kasperbauer, T.J.: Explanatory Unification in Cognitive Science

Maley, Corey and Gualtiero Piccinini: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: The Ontology of Functional Mechanisms

Mazman, Ayca and Lauren Pink: False Belief Attribution: An Investigation of the Neural Pattern Account

Meketa, Irina: A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition

Ryan Miller, Ivar Hannikainen and Fiery Cushman: Bad Actions or Bad Outcomes?
Differentiating Affective Contributions to the Moral Condemnation of Harm

Miracchi, Lisa: Making the Competence View a Contender

Peterson, Andrew: The Brain at War: Ethical and Epistemological Problems of Propranolol
Therapy for Combat-Induced Psychological Injury

Viger, Chris: A Model of Concept Acquisition

Weisberg, Michael: Remeasuring Man

Session 2: Friday, June 14

SAYLES HALL

Mun, Cecilea: What is an Emotion? What Are We Asking?

Nadelhoffer, Thomas, Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard and Chandra Sripada: The Free Will
Inventory

Phillips, Jonathan and Alex Worsnip: The Truth in Motivational Internalism

Sackris, David: An Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Modals

Saunders, Leland: Reason and Emotion; Not Reason or Emotion

Schechter, Elizabeth: Self-Reference in the Split-Brain Subject

Schein, Chelsea and Kurt Gray: Two Minds vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines
Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism

Schwan, Ben: Looking in Our Heads: Distinguishing the Theory Theory's Account of the
Conscious Stream from the Inner Sense Model's Intuition

Southworth, James: What is a Feeling? Revisiting William James' Theory of Emotion

Thomas, Bradley, Erik Asp, Michael Koenigs, Matthew Sutterer, Steven Anderson and Daniel
Tranel: Early Prefrontal Lesions Impair the Maturation of Moral Judgment

Thompson, Blake: Certain and Uncertainty Revisited: Color as a Psychobiological Property

Thompson, J. Robert: Behavior Rules and the Logical Problem: Striking Back

Turri, John and Peter Blouw: Exculpatory Pretense

Vanderhoek, Jonathan: Moral Judgment and Empathetic Perspective-Taking

Walker, Caren, Tania Lambrozo, Christine Legare and Alison Gopnik: Explanation,
Projectibility and Causal Learning

Winchell, David: Self-Deception, Agency, and Responsibility

PAPER SWAP PARTICIPANTS

Wednesday, June 12

SAYLES HALL

Alexander, Joshua (Siena College), Chad Gonnerman (Indiana University) and John Waterman (Johns Hopkins University): Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study

Anderson, Derek (University of Texas): Resolving Fodor's Learning Paradoxes

Beaulac, Guillaume and Frédéric-Ismaël Banville (University of Western Ontario): Dual-process epistemology: The descriptive project

Bedny, Marina, Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): To peek and to peer: "visual" verb meanings are unaffected by congenital blindness

Bitter, David (New York University/ Central European University): Distortions in the Perceived Lightness of Faces: A Defense of Cognitive Impenetrability

Brook, Andrew (Carleton University): Tracking Persons Over Time is Tracking What?

Cratsley, Kelso (University of Massachusetts, Boston): Explaining Disordered Emotion

Davis, Jake (CUNY Graduate Center/ Brown University): Desirable Desire: A Second-Order Approach to Dual-Process Moral Psychology

De-Medonsa, Michel (University of Pittsburgh): A Defense of the Cheater-Detection Mechanism: a rejection of Fodor's solution

Jacobs, Kenneth W., Dominique R. Stedham and Linda J. Hayes (University of Nevada, Reno): Locutionary Requisites and Action Orientation for Perceptual Events.

Liao, Shen-Yi (Kansas State University) and Aaron Meskin (University of Leeds): What is the Matter with Aesthetic Adjectives?

Mugg, Joshua (York University): The Two-System Hypothesis and Simultaneous Contradictory Belief

Nahmias, Eddy (Georgia State University), Jason Shepard (Emory University) and Shane Reuter (Washington University, St. Louis): It's OK if 'my brain made me do it': People's intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction

Norby, Aaron and Jonathan Phillips (Yale University): Ignoring Uncertainty

Pearlberg, Danny (Ohio State University): Making Sense of the Different Senses of 'Explanation'

Ritchie, J. Brendan (University of Maryland): Representational Content, Asymmetric Dependence, and Signal Detection Theory

Rottman, Joshua (Boston University), Liqi Zhu (Chinese Academy of Sciences) and Deborah Kelemen (Boston University): Cultural Influences on the Naturally Developing Teleological Stance: Evidence from China

Sheskin, Mark (Yale University), Amber Cazzell (Point Loma Nazarene University), Adam Croom (University of Pennsylvania), Tanya Mayer (Yale University) and Paul Bloom (Yale University): Quality Equality: Young Children Divide Resources Equally, Not Fairly

Spaulding, Shannon (Oklahoma State University): Implicit Mindreading

Vogel, Christopher, Alexis Wellwood, Rachel Dudley & J. Brendan Ritchie (University of Maryland): Causation in Language and Vision

Waller, Robyn (Florida State University): Beyond Button Presses: The Neuroscience of Free and Morally Appraisable Actions

ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

(alphabetical order, by 1st author)

Vincent Abruzzo (University of Massachusetts - Amherst): Grounding Self-Knowledge in the Brain's Modal Systems

Traditional theories of self-knowledge assume that we have transparent access to at least some of our own propositional attitudes. This assumption has recently come under attack. Peter Carruthers' (2011) Interpretive Sensory-Access theory of self-knowledge maintains that we infer all of our own propositional attitudes in much the same way that we infer the propositional attitudes of others. In this paper, I argue that the Interpretive Sensory-Access theory arrives at this conclusion only because it assumes an amodal view of cognition. If we allow for a modal view of cognition, such as those proposed by the various research programs under the heading of neo-empiricism, then we can avoid the conclusion that we have only interpretive access to our propositional attitudes. I also explore the limits of our access to our propositional attitudes, the possibility of a hybrid theory, and the implications that these theories have for amodal theorists who wish to maintain that we have transparent access to our propositional attitudes.

Toni Adleberg (Georgia State University), Morgan Thompson (Georgia State University) and Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University): Women and Philosophy: Why is it "goodbye" at "hello"?

Discussion of the "gender gap" in philosophy is often focused on the underrepresentation of graduate students and professors, yet the greatest drop-off in women's enrollment occurs after introductory courses. We recommend investigating the cause of this initial loss of women in philosophy. Buckwalter and Stich (2010) have proposed that women leave philosophy early because they have different philosophical intuitions than men. However, their results are not statistically corrected for multiple comparisons. In light of this methodological flaw, we re-ran their studies. We failed to replicate their results and suggest looking elsewhere for an explanation of the loss of women in philosophy. To begin, we conducted a climate survey of over 700 students completing the Introduction to Philosophy course at our university. Highlights of our findings include that: participants did not report instances of explicit bias; women are less likely than men to feel confident in their philosophical aptitude; women are less comfortable than their male peers in philosophy classes; women disagree more strongly that a "fair proportion" of the authors read in their class were women; and these differences do not seem to be dependent on the gender of the instructor. We also found evidence of differences between black and white students parallel the differences between female and male students. Our results suggest that, while men and women do not seem to have different philosophical intuitions, they have different experiences in introductory philosophy classes. We conclude with several suggestions for boosting female enrollment and recommendations for further research.

Mark Alicke (Ohio University) and David Rose (Rutgers University): When Intentions Go Awry

Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM) is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. We describe three studies: one in which a woman achieves desired consequences in an improbable way; a second in which harmful consequences of an intentional act are barely avoided; and a third in which a desired effect occurs due to unforeseen circumstances. Each study varies information about the main character such as to make him or her a sympathetic or unsympathetic figure. Consistent with culpable control assumptions, perceptions of intent and related attributions were strongly influenced by characterizations of the main actor, even though these characterizations were irrelevant to the main outcome.

Elinor Amit (Harvard University), Cheryl Wakslak (University of Southern California) and Yaacov Trope (New York University): How Distance Affects the Use of Visual and Verbal Means of Communication

The current study investigated the effect of distance on medium preferences in interpersonal communication. Five experiments showed that people's preference for using pictures (vs. words) is increasingly higher when communicating with temporally, socially, or geographically proximal (vs. distal) others. In contrast, preference for words is increasingly higher when communicating with those who were distal. A sixth experiment showed that communication's medium influences distance preferences, such that people's preference for communicating a message to a distant (vs. proximal) target is greater for verbal compared with pictorial communications. A seventh experiment showed that recipients are more likely to heed a sender's suggestions when the medium and distance are congruent. These findings reflect the suitability of pictures for communication with proximal others and words with distal others. Implications of these findings for construal level theory, perspective taking, the development of language, and social skills with children are discussed.

Erik Angner (George Mason University): Subjective Well-being: When and Why It Matters

The purpose of this paper is to give a principled answer to the question of under what conditions measures of happiness or life satisfaction, understood as subjectively experienced mental states, can serve as proxies for well-being. According to a widely held view, measures of happiness and life satisfaction represent well-being because happiness and life satisfaction are constitutive of well-being. This position, however, is untenable. Efforts to address this question in terms of Amartya Sen's capability approach have been similarly unsuccessful. Instead, I argue, happiness and life satisfaction matter because, and insofar as, people want to be happy and/or satisfied; consequently, measures of happiness and life satisfaction can serve as measures of well-being whenever happiness is sufficiently correlated with or causally efficacious in bringing about greater preference satisfaction. While this position entails a less expansive view of the uses of happiness and life satisfaction measures, I maintain that if their proponents were to take this line, many of the objections to their enterprise can be met.

Nomy Arpaly (Brown University): Virtues, Desires and Character Traits

It is often said that being virtuous requires having robust character traits. It is also said, by other philosophers, that scientific results show that such traits do not exist. I would like to present a different picture in which being virtuous is a matter of having the right intrinsic desires, bypassing the issue of robust character traits altogether and accommodating some virtue-ethical and some situationist intuitions. Relatedly, I examine the truism that the virtuous person always does the right thing in the right circumstances in the right way.

David Bennett (Brown University) and Jeremy Goodman (Oxford University): Measuring up the world in size and distance perception

Were we shrunk to half our size, the things around us would look twice as big to us as they actually do, and it wouldn't be an illusion. How can this be? We sketch an account of size perception that accommodates the 'body-scaled' character of size phenomenology. We then discuss the superficially similar and widely discussed work of Dennis Proffitt and collaborators, according to which visual experience 'scales' the world using a range of morphological, physiological, and behavioral 'units' or 'rulers'. We show that Proffitt's view falls afoul of basic measurement-theoretic considerations that our theory respects. We close with some general morals about the link between the contents and perspectival phenomenology of perceptual experience."

Worth Boone (University of Pittsburgh): Range Content, Attention and the Precision of Representation

Representationism maintains that phenomenal character is determined by representational content. Block (2010) presents an argument against this determination thesis. He cites effects of shifts in

attention on visual phenomenology, arguing that the representationist can only accommodate these effects by positing range contents. Range contents are representations of particular features as continuous sets of values rather than as a single, maximally specific value—e.g. representation of a visual stimulus as 16-28% contrast as opposed to 22% contrast. Block argues that the breadth of range content necessary to account for effects of attention is too large to be reflected in phenomenal experience, thus undermining the representationist's claim that representational content determines phenomenal character. In this paper, I present a counterargument on behalf of the representationist. I show that Block incorrectly assumes that shifts in attention cannot affect the precision of range contents. If the precision of range content varies across shifts in attention, then the representationist can account for the corresponding changes in visual phenomenology in terms of changes to representational content without undermining the determination thesis.

Felipe de Brigard (Harvard University), Karl Szpunar (Harvard University) and Daniel Schacter (Harvard University): Coming to Grips with the Past: Effect of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts

When people revisit previous experiences they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employs a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they re-simulated self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of ease, detail, and valence. This finding suggests differences between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and non-pathological anxiety are discussed.

Maria Brincker (University of Massachusetts - Boston): The Aesthetic Stance: On the conditions and consequences of becoming a beholder

How can we understand our engagements with art and aesthetic experiences in general? In this paper I outline a dynamic and embodied framework for an empirically minded study of aesthetics. This “aesthetic stance” approach is introduced to capture the embodied dynamics as a perceiver aesthetically engages – and disengages – a perceptual event. In other words it pertains to the conditions and consequences of becoming a beholder. The model uses 18th century philosophy and phenomenological observations regarding aesthetic affordances, but is also supported by recent research particularly in the areas of sensorimotor modulation and large-scale brain networks. I thus argue that neuroscience can be an incredible resource for aesthetics – if indeed scientists take the dynamic, social and environmental complexities of both aesthetic experience and brain function more seriously than has been the case in so-called “neuro-aesthetics”.

Michael Brownstein (New Jersey Institute of Technology): Implicit Bias, Context, and Character

This paper considers the ethical ramifications of the effects of context on the activation and expression of implicit biases. I begin by laying out evidence demonstrating the context-dependence of implicit attitudes and biases. I then argue that this element of implicit bias poses an ethical threat which is distinct from the more familiar one that implicit biases cause agents to act in ways that they disavow. Whereas the familiar worry is that implicit biases cause agents to be internally disharmonious, the worry from context-dependence is that implicit biases threaten the stability of agents' character. However, there are strategies for utilizing the context-dependence of implicit bias for overcoming the problem of characterological instability. I discuss strategies found in the attitude change literature and in the animal learning literature.

Wesley Buckwalter (University of Waterloo), David Rose (Rutgers University) and John Turri (University of Waterloo): Belief Though Thick and Thin

We distinguish between two categories of belief — thin belief and thick belief — and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief).

Robin Clark (University of Pennsylvania): Evolutionary Pragmatics

Evolutionary pragmatics is concerned with how language develops as a signaling system in a population over time. While a great deal of work in linguistic pragmatics has focused on descriptions of language use in context, the question of why the systems we observe take the form they take is a question of their history and dynamic properties (Bowles (2006)). We propose to study the question in light of strategic settings imported from game theory, particularly the theory of signaling and games of incomplete information (Clark (2013)). These settings are embedded in a population and their dynamic properties are studied systematically (see, in particular, the work of Schelling (1978)). I'll present two case studies: The *Ærst*, taken from the *Æeld* of politeness (Brown and Levinson (1987), Spencer-Oatey (2008)), develops a model based on animal signaling (Searcy and Nowicki (2005)) and develops a model of begging due to Johnstone (1997), where need and cost are brought into equilibrium and determine the level of politeness to be used. The second case study considers the maintenance of honesty in a system where some agents have an interest in deception. We will develop a system based on games of partial common interest (Blume et al. (2001)) and show that, in the absence an external social force, honest signaling collapses. We can then show that reputation can be used as the force that maintains the quality of signaling (in the sense of Grice (1975)).

Dan Demetriou (University of Minnesota - Morris): Authority vs. Honor: A crucial distinction for moral science

Philosophers are increasingly receptive to the notion that our moral intuitions are not of one monolithic thing, "morality," but in fact represent a handful of radically different moral systems based on cooperation, harm-reduction, purity, authority, etc. This pluralism is informed by adaptationist accounts explaining why humans would find moralizing according to these systems intuitive. The quality of the science investigating the roots of these normative systems and their cognitive correlates will be limited by the quality of the moral taxonomies assumed from the outset. The taxonomical confusion this essay addresses is the conflation of authoritarian and honor norms. Authoritarian norms concern hierarchies, or rankings such that control and responsibility flow down and obedience flows up. In contrast, honor norms concern mere prestige rankings, which have nothing to do with control, responsibility, or obedience. The concomitant norms of these two values are thus importantly different. The authority/honor distinction yields immediate benefits for moral psychology by resolving an important outstanding puzzle for Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I conclude by sketching a theory of honor's ontogeny in humans, and hypothesize on the general forces that predict the proto-honorable behavior we observe in even non-human animals.

Daniel C. Dennett, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University: The Role of Cultural Evolution in Shaping Our Minds

A human brain is composed of perhaps a hundred billion clueless neurons (and many more other cells), and somehow the coordination of their activities produces a mind. But how much of the coordination is provided genetically, and developmentally, and how much by the acquisition of coordinating systems from the environment — specific languages, customs, practices, habits, fashions, techniques, and so forth? I will argue that our minds are as much the products of culture as the producers of culture.

Michael Devitt (CUNY Graduate Center): Testing Theories of Reference

How should we test theories of reference? The received view is that we should test them against referential intuitions. How could this be acceptable? We should not go along with the common philosophical view that these intuitions are a priori. Philosophers might follow linguists in thinking that linguistic intuitions are “the voice” of our linguistic competence. But this view is false. Rather than relying solely on the indirect evidence of intuitions, theories of reference need direct evidence from linguistic usage. The method of elicited production seems a promising way to gather this evidence. But this turns out to be more difficult than one might expect, as a recent experiment revealed. The paper briefly explores the main problem, that of implicit scare quotes.

Catherine Driscoll (North Carolina State University): Neither Adaptive Thinking Nor Reverse Engineering: Methods in the evolutionary social sciences

In this paper I argue the best examples of the methods in the Evolutionary Social Sciences don't really resemble either of the two methods called “Adaptive Thinking” or “Reverse Engineering” described by the evolutionary psychologists. Both AT and RE have significant problems. Instead, the best adaptationist work in the ESSs seems to be based on and is aiming at a different method that has elements of both AT and RE. I describe this method and show how it escapes the main criticisms of both AT and RE posed in the literature. Finally, I describe a remaining problem for adaptationist reasoning of this kind.

Rachel Fedock (CUNY Graduate Center): The Emotions of Caring About

Within discussions of the moral emotions, care has received little attention and analysis. I argue that care is of critical moral importance, serving as a precondition for experiencing other motivating moral emotions. I utilize a modified version of Grice's cancellability test for conversational implicature as a starting point to analyze the concept care. This analysis reveals that concern and sympathy are necessary to caring about, and sufficient to demonstrate caring about, concern being the most paradigmatic emotion of care. Contrastingly, I argue that empathy is not necessary to caring about, nor is it sufficient to demonstrate caring about.

Chaz Firestone (Yale University) and Brian Scholl (Yale University): “Top-Down” Effects Where None Should be Found: The ‘El Greco’ fallacy in perception research

A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states including moods, beliefs, and action-capabilities can literally and directly affect what we see. Are these truly effects on perception? Here, we exploit an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called “El Greco fallacy”) to demonstrate empirically that multiple alleged top-down effects (from effects of morality on lightness perception to effects of action-capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be perceptual. We suggest that this error also contaminates several additional top-down effects, and that this discovery has implications for psychological and philosophical debates over the (dis)continuity of perception and cognition.

Susan Fiske (Princeton University): Varieties of (De) Humanization: Separated by Competition and Status

Recognizing or denying another's humanity varies predictably along apparently universal dimensions of the other's perceived warmth (trustworthiness) and competence. New data reveal distinct neural and behavioral signatures of (de)humanizing responses to distinct kinds of ingroups and outgroups on these dimensions. The most dehumanized outgroups (low on both warmth and competence) elicit disgust and avoidance, devalued as literally worth-less. In contrast, groups disliked for seeming cold but respected for competence elicit envy and Schadenfreude. Reactions to pitied outgroups — disrespected for seeming incompetent, but apparently likable enough for seeming trustworthy and warm — focus on prescriptions for their behavior. The humanization of ingroup members, who are both liked and respected, reflects individuating processes in impression formation, not necessarily accurate but at least three-dimensionally human.

William Fleeson (Wake Forest University): Whole Trait Theory: A model of broad, powerful character traits that is based on situation effects

The preponderance of empirical evidence appears to support the existence of broad, powerful traits. Yet experimental results demonstrate powerful abilities of situations to make people act out of character. In this talk, I describe whole trait theory. Whole trait theory is a modern theory of personality based on decades of empirical results. It reconciles inconsistency with consistency and maintains the importance of both broad, powerful traits and human sensitivity to situations. I propose that empirically grounded accounts of character dispositions will look like the ones described in whole trait theory. Honesty is discussed as an example.

Robert Foley (University College Dublin): The Complex Action Criterion of Consciousness

This paper proposes a new criterion for the attribution of consciousness of an object to a subject. The complex action criterion of consciousness (CACC) is based on the claim that the ability to use information about an object flexibly is indicative of consciousness of that object. It is argued that this criterion is potentially dissociable from reportability, thus offering the opportunity to test whether the two types of access are dissociable. Exclusion tasks are discussed as a potential means for testing this, and it is suggested that with certain alterations they could serve as an experimental paradigm for testing for the dissociability of reportability and the capacities picked out by CACC.

Geoffrey P. Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania): Moral character Predominates in Person Perception and Evaluation

What sorts of trait information do people most care about when forming impressions of others? Recent theories of social cognition suggests that social “warmth”, broadly construed, is of prime importance. However, in this research, we show that information about others’ specifically moral traits (their “moral character”) is more important. We first show that moral character and social warmth traits are distinguishable constructs. Further studies using a variety of methods show that moral character information is more important in determining global impressions of others than is social warmth information. These results call for revision of current theories of person perception.

Kurt Gray (UNC Chapel Hill), Chelsea Schein (UNC Chapel Hill) and Adrian Ward (Harvard University): The Harm Hypothesis: Moral judgment is unified by a dyadic template of perceived harm

What unifies moral judgments? Although prior research suggests that morality can be divided into descriptively distinct domains, these domains may not be psychologically distinct. Building on the theory of dyadic morality, we suggest that all moral judgments--regardless of content type--remain psychologically bound to perceived harm. This talk will present eight studies that demonstrate that ostensibly harmless moral violations remain explicitly (Studies 1-5) and implicitly (Studies 6-8) tied to harm. These results provide support for dyadic morality and the harm hypothesis--the idea that morality is unified by perceptions of harm. They also raise doubts about moral theories that take for granted the existence of “harmless moral transgressions.”

Steven Gross (Johns Hopkins University): Is Temporal Representation Constitutively Necessary for Perception?

Is temporal representation—the capacity to represent times, duration, or other temporal phenomena—constitutively necessary for perception? I believe not. Here, I support this claim through a critical discussion of Tyler Burge’s recent (2010) argument for the opposite conclusion. I critically discuss as well a distinct argument built from materials he supplies. My discussion also suggests that primitive forms of memory do not require temporal representation.

Chaohui Guo (University of Zurich), Sunhae Sul (Korea University), Nora Heinzelmann (University of Oxford), Christian Ruff (University of Zurich) and Ernst Fehr (University of Zurich): A TMS Investigation into the Role of rTPJ in Donation Behavior

We present a study that uses repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to provide evidence for the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is responsible for the implementation of deservingness evaluations into donation behaviour. rTMS to rTPJ reduced donations to charities significantly but did not have any effect on the deservingness ratings itself. Our findings suggest that the role of the rTPJ might be more complex than current scientific opinion has it: first, rTPJ might be prominently involved in the implementation of attribute ascriptions into decision-making. Second, it might be responsible for a sense of agency concerning more distant outcomes of actions such as donations. Third, it might play a crucial role for behaviour towards more abstract entities like charities, not just towards other persons.

Valerie Hardcastle (University of Cincinnati): Radical Embodied Cognition and the Problem of Consciousness

In his book *Radical Embodied Cognition* (2009), Tony Chemero (along with Michael Silberstein) advance the radical thesis that cognition and consciousness are actually the same thing. He draws this conclusion from his understanding of cognition as a dynamical, non-linear, and extended process. I question this conclusion. Even if, at bottom, we are the brain-body-environmental synergies that Chemero and others claim we are (e.g., Anderson et al. 2012, Chemero and Silberstein 2011, Kello and van Orden 2009, Kelso 2009), we will not be able to conclude that consciousness just is cognition because this view actually expands cognition beyond being the sort of natural kind upon which to hook phenomenal experience.

Yoram Hazony (Institute for Advanced Studies, Shalem Center): A Solution to the Problem of Basic Emotions

There are scores of distinguishable human emotions. The problem of whether this profusion of emotions can be reduced to a number of fundamental ones from which the others are derived has been called the problem of basic emotions. In this paper, I propose a solution to the problem of basic emotions. I propose a system of six basic emotions in three oppositional pairs—exhilaration/despondency, anger/fear, and desire/disgust—resembling those in Hering’s solution to the problem of basic colors. Together, these six emotions define a 3-dimensional “emotion space” that is apparently capable of mapping the entire domain of human emotion, suggesting that at least a substantial substrate of every emotion may in fact derive from blends of the six basic ones. The simplicity and explanatory purchase offered by such a solution distinguish it as an advance in comparison to previous attempts to discover order in this domain.

Erik G. Helzer (Wake Forest University), R. Michael Furr (Wake Forest University) and William Fleeson (Wake Forest University): Visible Virtues: Self/other agreement in the perception of moral character

To what degree are people’s perceptions of their own moral character shared by those around them? The issue of self/other agreement in person perception has been explored through different analytical lenses over the years, and each lens provides a different answer to the question of whether people see themselves as others see them. Self and other tend not to agree on targets’ absolute standing on a particular moral trait, however, self/other ratings of moral character do tend to correlate with one another, and self and other tend to agree on a target’s overall profile of moral traits. The purpose of this talk is to better understand the sort of agreement that exists (and the sort that does not exist) between self- and other-reports of moral character, and to elucidate some of the consequences of these different kinds of agreement.

Christopher Hill (Brown University) and David Bennett (Brown University): A Multiple Relations Account of the Unity of Experience

We defend a view of the ‘unity of experience’ where there is not one ‘unity-making’ relation between experiences (as in Bayne 2010), but many. In Part I we briefly survey sensory integration unity-making relations. In Part II we briefly discuss more cognitive, ‘accessibility’ unity-making relations. In Part III we point out that there is an interesting, non-trivial, contingent kind of ‘subject unity’ principle—pace Bayne and Chalmers (2003). In Part IV we anticipate objections to our ‘multiple relations’ view of the unity of experience.

Linus Ta-Lun Huang (University of Sydney): The Nativist Input Problem

Recently, several innovative models were proposed by Evolutionary Psychologists to explain human flexibility through learning to self-assemble, out of our adaptive toolbox, new mechanisms that solve novel problems. In this paper, I identify a serious information routing problem, “the nativist input problem”, distinct from the *a priori* and really real input problems introduced by Fodor. The nativist input problem is, briefly, a crippling limitation to the range of contexts in which a massively modular architecture can handle information routing reliably. I argue that it undermines Evolutionary Psychology’s explanation of human flexibility, highlighting nativism as one of its most problematic commitments.

Kent Johnson (UC- Irvine): Notational Variants and Invariance in Linguistics

This paper argues that the much-maligned ‘notational variants’ of a given formal grammar play a role similar to alternative numerical measurement scales. Thus, they can be used to identify the invariant components of the grammar that do not depend on the choice of empirically equivalent representation. Two examples are given of how linguistic theorizing can profit from adopting a measurement-theoretic viewpoint. The first addresses Quine’s concerns about guiding vs. fitting. The second addresses the notion of simplicity in the current biolinguistics program. An unexpected similarity with behaviorism is also uncovered. The paper concludes with some practical gestures.

Lee Jussim (Rutgers University): Conservatives as Canaries in the Coal Mine: Symptom of Sickness Sapping Scientific Social Psychology

Social and personality psychologists are overwhelmingly liberal in their ideological sympathies. The skewness of the ideological distribution in these fields appears to be driven by a mix of self-selection, hostile-workplace processes, and direct discrimination. These biases are important for two reasons:

1. They unfairly discriminate against individual scientists; 2. They lead the “science” of social psychology to entirely unjustified and distorted “conclusions” about potentially politicized topics via a slew of questionable interpretive practices (QIPs). QIPs are the more serious scientific problem because they constitute threats to the scientific integrity of social psychology. QIPs include: selective preference (publication, funding, citations) given to politically congenial studies; blind spots (selectively ignoring politically uncomfortable results), and mythmaking (extolling weak or irreproducible findings as powerful and pervasive IF they bolster liberal narratives of oppression; politically distasteful results are systematically overlooked and ignored). Several specific examples of each type of QIP will be presented, involving questionable publication, IRB, and funding decisions; selectively ignoring research on rational and accurate stereotyping; and selectively extolling irreproducible expectancy-confirmation studies. Amazingly, I nonetheless conclude with a slew of reasons to be optimistic social psychology’s future.

Lena Kästner (Ruhr University - Bochum): Mechanistic Explanation and Interlevel Manipulation

Cross-level experiments are part and parcel of cognitive neuroscience. Mechanistic explanations successfully capture this feature of scientific practice. To mechanistically explain a (cognitive) phenomenon requires identifying its underlying (neural) mechanism, viz. its constitutively relevant parts and their causal interactions. However, the mechanistic account of constitutive relevance and how it can

be distinguished from causal relevance is unsatisfying for several reasons. Closer inspection of empirical research practices further reveals that the mechanistic picture of cross-level experimentation is rather crude. Taking into account a broader range of experimental strategies employed in cognitive neuroscience may help to overcome (some of) these problems.

Camillia Kong (University of Essex): Status Rather than Function in Capacity Assessments: The case of Re E

Since the establishment of Mental Capacity Act 2005, judges are increasingly called upon to assess the capacity of care-recipients to make decisions regarding their medical treatment and care provisions. The statute stipulates that capacity must be determined through a functional, decision-specific test so as to protect individual autonomy. This means that an undesirable outcome (i.e. death of the patient) or status (i.e. the diagnosis of a mental illness) cannot determine whether an individual has decision-making capacity or not. In May 2012 a best interest ruling in The Court of Protection was made in to force life-preserving treatment on a severely anorexic woman. Both the contemporaneous wishes and advanced directives of the patient were overridden on grounds that she lacked capacity to make decisions regarding her medical treatment. The paper argues that closer analysis of the finding of current and retrospective incapacity reveals the violation of statutory requirements due to the application of a status-based rather than functional test of capacity. I examine, problematise, and ultimately reject the possibility that a finding of incapacity was based on (i) dysfunctional executive function and/or (ii) inauthentic pathological value. This brings to the fore certain issues surrounding the MCA's functional approach to capacity in relation to certain mental disorders, such as anorexia nervosa. Moreover, the best interest decision to force-feed the patient could be deemed invalid due to the implicit application of a status-based test in Re E.

Jorie Koster-Hale (MIT), Marina Bedny (MIT) and Rebecca Saxe (MIT): Thinking About Seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded similarly in the mentalizing regions of sighted and blind adults

'Theory of Mind' (theory of mind), the ability to reason about mental experiences such as beliefs and desires, depends on a specific network of brain regions, including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). We investigated whether these brain regions represent the perceptual source of another's knowledge, using multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPA). From the spatial pattern in the RTPJ, we could decode whether an attributed mental state involves hearing vs. seeing (i.e. perceptual source) but not positive vs. negative affect (i.e. valence). To test the effects of first-person experience on these representations, we repeated the experiment in congenitally blind participants and found that, as in sighted people, the RTPJ encoded source but not valence. We conclude that (1) perceptual source information is coded in theory of mind brain regions and is a feature of theory of mind, and (2) theory of mind representations of perceptual source are not based on first-person perceptual experiences.

Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown University): Expert communities and the pragmatics of peripheral speech

While there is a voluminous literature on the social epistemology of expertise, the pragmatic structure of expert speech has received minimal attention. Expert speech encompasses more than just testimonial declarations, and I investigate some of that complexity here. In particular, I explore how speech acts are used to constitute and display the boundaries of expert communities, and the norms that govern those communities. I concentrate on what Cassie Herbert and I have dubbed 'peripheral speech.' Peripheral speech is not institutionally sanctioned expert speech, but rather speech that draws on the shared expertise and social identity of expert community members in an informal way, around the margins of the official business of the community. It can include jokes, blogging, gossip, social media interactions, and so forth. I explore the performative structure of peripheral speech and how it works to negotiate expert community membership.

**Maurice Lamb (University of Cincinnati) and Anthony Chemero (University of Cincinnati):
Understanding Dynamical Models**

Neo-mechanists argue that in order for a claim to be an explanation in cognitive science it must reveal something about the mechanisms of a cognitive system. Recently they have claimed that JAS Kelso and colleagues working on cognitive systems have begun to favor mechanistic explanations of neuroscientific phenomena; particular in the application of the neural field model to rhythmic coordination behaviors. We will argue that this view is the result of a failure to understand dynamic systems explanations and the general structure of dynamic systems research. Further we argue that the explanations by Kelso and colleagues cited are in fact not mechanistic explanations. In this paper, we will show that these neo-mechanists have misunderstood the work by Kelso and colleagues, which blunts the force of one of their arguments.

**Justin Landy (University of Pennsylvania) and Geoffrey Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania):
Valuing Different Human Lives**

People affirm the equality of human lives, yet show systematic preferences in life-and-death decisions. Studies 1–3 showed that individuals are seen as having roughly equal rights not to be killed, but less equal rights to be saved, and found that older children are prioritized over younger children. Study 4 showed that this may be due to the greater investment in older children, their better developed social relations, and their greater understanding of death. Studies 5a–5c demonstrated causal effects of these variables on perceived value. Studies 6-7 showed that more meaningful social relations primarily explain older children’s greater valuation.

**Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): Bem, Stapel, Etc.: What’s Wrong with Psychology?
And What’s to be Done About It?**

Well-known effects fail to replicate, results are viewed with suspicion, gossips fly around the coffee machine in psychology labs: psychology is in turmoil, and intense methodological battles are currently being fought. Philosophers of psychology should contribute to these debates, bringing in their analytical acumen. In this talk, I will discuss some of the methodological problems in contemporary psychology and assess some of the proposed solutions.

John Michael (Copenhagen University), Kristian Sandberg (Aarhus University), Josh Skewes (Aarhus University), Thomas Wolf (Vienna University), Jakob Blicher (Aarhus University), Morten Overgaard (Aarhus University) and Chris Frith (Wellcome Trust): TMS (cTBS) Demonstrates a Causal Role of Premotor Homunculus in Action Interpretation

Although it is well established that regions of ventral premotor cortex (vPMC) are active during action observation [1-7], it remains controversial whether that activation plays a causal role in action interpretation [8-13]. In the experiment reported here, we used offline continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) to investigate this question. All participants received offline cTBS to the hand area of vPMC in one session and to the lip area in a separate session, and after each session performed an action-interpretation task in which half of the trials were pantomimed hand actions and half were pantomimed mouth actions. The results show that participants were less accurate in interpreting hand actions after receiving cTBS over the hand area than after receiving stimulation over the lip area, and less accurate at interpreting lip actions after receiving cTBS over the lip area than after receiving stimulation over the hand area. This double dissociation provides evidence in support of the claim that somatotopically organized regions of vPMC contribute causally to action interpretation, and the claim that action production and action interpretation rely on overlapping mechanisms. In more general terms, they reveal an involvement of the motor system in more sophisticated cognitive processes than has hitherto been demonstrated.

Hisashi Nakao (Nagoya University) and Kristin Andrews (York University): Ready to Learn: A critique of the theory of natural pedagogy

Recently developmental psychologists have offered a new theory of human uniqueness—theory of natural pedagogy (NP), according to which only humans are teachers and students, and they are innately so (Csibra and Gergeley 2006, 2009; Gergeley and Csibra 2008). According to NP human children have a set of cognitive adaptations that facilitates learning generalizable knowledge, especially in opaque contexts, from an adult who uses ostensive signals when modeling the behavior to be learned. The primary evidence for this claims comes from experiments on infants and young children. We examine the child development research that forms the backbone of evidence in favor of NP, and present four concerns: (1) there is evidence that ostensive cues are not part of a general learning process that facilitate learning across different domains of knowledge, which suggests that ostensive cues don't play crucial the role that NP takes them to play, (2) there is evidence that children are choosy about whom they learn from, and NP cannot account for this evidence, (3) NP cannot account for the complete data on overimitation; the cases they look at are cherry-picked, (4) at least one study suggesting that children are sensitive to ostensive cues can be explained without appeal to NP, in terms of the “indirect effect” of social referencing. Taken together, these critiques suggest to us that children do not have the set of cognitive adaptations advocated by NP.

Stephen Neale (CUNY Graduate Center): The Mythology of Context

No abstract available.

Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester): Grounding and Ontological Dependence in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense.

The goal of this paper is to defend the use of grounding and reality concepts in the philosophy of mind, in particular, those of Kit Fine (2001). The concepts and applications of several dependence frameworks are characterized and contrasted with those that have been of interest to philosophers of mind over the past couple of decades. A defense of grounding frameworks is offered in response to recent critiques that they have no genuine role to play in the philosophy of mind (e.g. Wilson (forthcoming))

L.A. Paul (UNC Chapel Hill): Understanding the manifest: metaphysics and cognitive science.

The metaphysician often starts with an account of the nature of the world at the level of the manifest, and then revises her account in response to evidence drawn from the natural sciences. While metaphysics should indeed be responsive to work in physics and other natural sciences, I argue that there is equal pressure for metaphysics to be responsive to empirical evidence from psychology, in particular, to be responsive to ways that cognitive science can inform our understanding of ordinary experience. I will explore this point in the context of recent discussions about the nature of temporal experience, and then expand the view by making connections between psychology and philosophical questions concerning epistemically transformative experiences.

Derek Powell (UCLA), Zachary Horne (University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign), Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University) and Keith Holyoak (UCLA): Justified true Belief Triggers False Recall of ‘Knowing’

“Gettier cases” are potential counterexamples to the view that *knowledge is justified true belief*. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read a story wherein a character ‘thought’ something was true. In a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ suggesting that the story activated their concept of knowledge. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a justified true belief than an unjustified belief. Interestingly, we also observed a comparable increase in false recall of ‘knew’ for a Gettier case.

Jake Quilty-Dunn (CUNY Graduate Center): Problems for the Indeterminacy of Translation

I try to advance a novel argument that indeterminacy of translation (“IT”) is incompatible with the underdetermination of theory by evidence (“UT”) in a way that renders IT incoherent. The problem

arises from an examination of Quine's "argument from above" that involves the translation of a radically foreign physicist's theory. I argue that there must be a fact of the matter about which theory the physicist holds, and about which theory the linguist attributes to her, that is underdetermined by all relevant behavior. This is incompatible with IT. I also argue that IT gets no support from inscrutability of reference.

Collin Rice (University of Pittsburgh): Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids

Edouard Machery has recently argued that there are multiple fundamental kinds of concepts—including prototypes, exemplars, and theories—and these kinds are typically processed by distinct cognitive processes. In this paper, I raise two objections to Machery's positive account and propose an alternative. Rather than dividing into distinct kinds with distinct processes, I argue that concepts are pluralistic hybrids. They are pluralistic because there are several concepts for the same category whose use is determined by context. They are hybrids because they often link several different kinds of information that are used in the same cognitive processes.

Joshua Shepherd (Florida State University): The Experience of Trying

Recent work on agential experience reveals a phenomenological hornet's nest of agential experience-types, many of which have yet to receive adequate attention. Purportedly, there are experiences of intending, trying, deciding, doing, control, efficacy, authorship, mental causation, freedom, effort, self-as-source, purposiveness, and more. In this paper I concentrate on a core type of agential experience – the experience of trying. According to many, all agential experiences are perceptual or sensory in nature – this is to say agential experience's intentional structure is exclusively descriptive (or thetic). In this paper I argue against the leading view. Central to my argument are studies on deafferented and paralyzed patients. It turns out that the agential experiences of deafferented and paralyzed patients give us reason to think experiences of trying possess directive (or telic) structure, and thus that consciousness is not exclusively descriptive.

Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University): Situationism and Character: Challenges and Responses

Philosophy has recently seen the rise of a position called 'situationism' which challenges virtue ethics. Virtue ethics maintains that persons can and should strive for an ideal: a well-integrated, deeply entrenched, and enduring character consisting (in part) of a constellation of global traits or virtues, that is, dispositions to act in ways that express qualities such as kindness, generosity, courage, and so on. Situationists challenge this conception of character. In two separate critiques, they argue that global traits either do not exist or have little to do with producing behavior, and that cognitive processing is too fragmented to ground the notion that practical rationality can produce and sustain the kind of integrated character presupposed by virtue ethics. In this presentation, I briefly outline the two situationist critiques, then suggest lines of response capable of producing traditional conceptions of character. All of this draws heavily on the work of psychologists.

Yujia Song (UNC Chapel Hill): Empathy, Proper Empathy, and Understanding

Recent developments in the ethics of care and in the research on the relationship between empathy and moral behavior in social and developmental psychology have sparked a renewed interest in the question, what is the role of empathy in morality? One may say empathy is required for acting morally, or it is a moral virtue, but we quickly realize empathy is not always good. The right thing to say then seems to be that empathy properly exercised must be good, or that morality requires not empathy simpliciter, but proper empathy. It is my aim in this paper to show that this move is misguided and unfruitful. I argue that the goals we want "proper" empathy to achieve are better formulated in terms of understanding others, except when the presence of empathy itself constitutes (part of) a proper moral response.

Christina Starmans (Yale University) and Ori Friedman (University of Waterloo): Why People Aren't Property: ownership and personhood

Although people in our culture are viewed as non-ownable, in the past people were commonly viewed as ownable property, and this remains true in some parts of the world. These cultural and historical variations may indicate that judgments about what can be owned are entirely a matter of cultural or legal conventions. However, in 5 experiments we provide evidence that cultural and legal conventions do not suffice to explain why people are viewed as non-ownable. The experiments suggest that people are viewed as non-ownable because they belong to the category “human”, and perhaps because they are viewed as having self-ownership.

Matthew Stewart (Simmons College): Witnessing Horror: Psychoanalysis and the abject horror of lynching photography

By the late nineteenth century, the proliferation of photography in the United States had provided a medium for preserving and re-witnessing the abject spectacle of a lynching. Through this photographic archivization of horror, lynch mobs propagated racial degradation and sustained segregatory borders by constructing a psychical illusion of whiteness as wholeness. In my investigation of lynching photographs largely produced in the southern United States between 1890 and 1940, and recently collected in James Allen's *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America*, I engage Lacanian and Kristevan psychoanalysis to philosophically contextualize the powers of racial violence at the intimate threshold of the psychic and the social. If, as Kristeva suggests in *Hatred and Forgiveness*, “there is no other way to approach an outburst of hate except to conduct an anamnesis of it” (184), then I aim to conduct an interpretive return to lynching photography in order to “untangle and reconstruct” the racial identities that are psychosocially constituted through archiving racial abjection (194). I argue that while lynching photographs are, indeed, archival objects intended to reinforce racial segregation through terrorization, they also function as what I am calling abject stains that disturb white racial identity by initiating an ethical encounter with the violently concealed lack or “shit,” as Lacan puts it in Seminar XI, that underpins whiteness (263). Advancing social theory through psychoanalysis, I inaugurate an analytical and ethical encounter with the Real of whiteness in order to unveil the “shit” that structures white racial identity in such abject scenes of hatred and horror.

Nina Strohminger (Duke University) and Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona): The Essential Moral Self

Many philosophers believe that the mind determines personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five studies, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental trait—are the most central to identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, particularly emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Higher-order goals and desires are more connected to the self than baser, first order desires. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that individual identity is largely determined by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a special focus on those associated with morality.

Arber Tasimi (Yale University), Susan Gelman (University of Michigan), Joshua Knobe (Yale University) and Andrei Cimpian (University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign): Of Merts and Men: The role of domain and valence in generalizations

Generic statements are language's way of expressing cognitively primitive generalizations. The mechanism that gives rise to these generalizations has several distinctive features, including a sensitivity to the valence of the property that is being generalized (e.g., negative properties are generalized most readily). We suggest that this view may be incomplete in a key respect, and find among children and adults that the acceptability of a generic statement is sensitive not only to the valence of the property but also to the identity of the category (people vs. animals vs. artifacts) that is involved in a generalization.

Blake Thompson (Virginia Tech): Certainty and Uncertainty Revisited: Color as a psychobiological property

In his essay “Objectivity and Subjectivity Revisited: Color as a Psychobiological Property”, Gary Hatfield asserts a claim about the nature of color. I propose to assess the extent to which Hatfield is justified in asserting this claim. Specifically, I intend to explicate four suppressed premises of the argument that Hatfield gives for this claim and examine their tenability. My conclusion is not that Hatfield is wrong. Rather, I show only that Hatfield’s confidence in his thesis is unjustified due to problematic features of the premises on which its truth is conditional.

John Turri (University of Waterloo) and Ori Friedman (University of Waterloo): The Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

Two assumptions anchor most contemporary discussions of knowledge in cases of (large, fair, single-winner) lotteries. First, based on the long odds alone, you can’t know that your ticket lost. Second, based on reading a news report of the winning numbers, you do know that your ticket lost. Moreover, it is often treated as an uncontroversial datum that this is how most people view matters. Explaining why people hold this combination of attitudes is then treated as a criterion for an acceptable theory of knowledge and knowledge attributions. But do people actually hold the views they’re assumed to hold? We did the necessary empirical work to find out. We studied people’s reactions to lottery cases and discovered that they respond as predicted. We report those results here. We also evaluate two previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in lottery cases; neither of them seems to work. Finally, we present evidence for a new explanation for why some people deny knowledge in lottery cases. We suggest that some people deny knowledge due to formulaic expression.

Sandra Upson (Managing Editor, *Scientific American Mind*): Cognitive Science on Deadline: Context, Ethics and Error in Science Journalism

Insights from psychology and neuroscience touch on issues of daily relevance to all of us: stress, memory, relationships and more. The public appetite for news on these topics has fueled an outpouring of popular coverage, with mixed results. This talk will trace how mistakes originate and creep into media portrayals of the brain sciences. I will explore why missteps occur, how journalistic ethics can get subverted, and what researchers can do to improve science communication.

Simine Vazire (Washington University in St. Louis): Facing Our Selves: Life at the Border of Self-Deception and Self-Awareness

Do people know themselves? On one hand, people are blind to aspects of their personality that they should know, and indeed that others are able to see. This is at least in part because self-views are replete with bias, both positive and negative. On the other hand, people have insight into their own self-deception, and even narcissists know that their self-views are not realistic. This juxtaposition of self-ignorance and self-insight raises important questions about the nature of self-knowledge, and suggests that people have more self-awareness than their self-reports suggest. Furthermore, self-knowledge has significant interpersonal benefits, which raises questions about why people engage in self-deception and how self-knowledge can be improved.

Deirdre Wilson (University College London and Center for the Study of Mind in Nature - University of Oslo): Beyond Speaker’s Meaning

The goal of Gricean approaches to pragmatics is to explain how hearers identify the speaker’s meaning using linguistic and contextual clues. This paper (written jointly with Dan Sperber), argues that Grice’s notion of speaker’s meaning lacks the degree of unity or autonomy needed to make it the proper object of a philosophical definition or an explanatory theory, and that the account of *ostensive-inferential communication* developed in relevance theory and inspired by Grice (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95; Wilson & Sperber 2012) provides a better basis for explaining how linguistic meaning and contextual information interact in utterance interpretation.

Steven Yamamoto (Brown University): Two Doubts About the Way We See Affordances

In this paper, I argue that we have reason to doubt two claims in the literature about the relation in which representations of affordance properties stand to other representations. First, according to Gibson's original account, affordance perception is more basic than perception of what are traditionally taken to be "low-level" properties. I argue against this claim, arguing that it has less empirical support than one might think. Second, I dispute the claim that studies involving unilateral neglect patients show that affordance properties feature in our visual experience independently of our experience of traditional "low-level" properties.

POSTER ABSTRACTS

Session 1: Thursday, June 13

SAYLES HALL

Sean Allen-Hermanson (Florida International University): Development of eye morphology relevant to gaze cuing in the human infant

The human eye is a puzzler—unique in the animal world—in which the visible sclera, or white region surrounding the iris, is unusually large and the opening of the eye (palpebral fissure) is elongated horizontally. According to the Cooperative Eye Hypothesis the large area of exposed, white, sclera offset by dark iris, is an adaptation for advertising gaze, enabling joint and shared attention, improving communication, and facilitating altruistic social behavior. Interestingly, the sclera-iris ratio of children is noticeably less than adults—that is, the iris takes up relatively more space. However, it has not been investigated when in human development the infant eye begins to resemble the adult eye. We have quantified when the eye of the human infant begins to approach the morphology of the adult, finding that the iris occupies a much greater proportion of the visible surface of a child's eye up to the highest age we have explored (21 months), and thus there is suggestion of continued development beyond toddlerhood. Our results have interesting implications for varied hypotheses implicating the sclera-to-iris ratio in gaze following, cooperative behavior, and directing others' attention to external targets deceptively. It may be the case that the child's eye develops along with the child's cognitive ability to take advantage of purposeful and directed gaze in social situations.

Daniel Burnston (University of California, San Diego): Re-Cognizing Perception and Cognition

Philosophical and cognitive science approaches to cognitive architecture have chosen to analyze the relationship between perception and cognition along the lines of what I call the internal effect view, on which the presence of a cognitive state modifies the computations performed by a perceptual process, and thereby shapes the content of its output. I argue that this conception is deeply mistaken. I suggest an alternative, external effect view of the relationship that I argue better captures the diverse roles of cognition in shaping perceptual activity, without falling prey to the problems with the internal effect view. I conclude by discussing some ways in which the external effect view provides a corrective for current investigations into cognitive architecture.

Hyundeuk Cheon (Seoul National University): Experimental semantics about natural kind terms: an east asian perspective

Although most philosophers share semantic-externalistic intuitions, recent empirical studies by Machery and colleagues have demonstrated that semantic intuitions about proper names vary across and within cultures. This research aims to extend this line of inquiry to investigate the nature of semantic reference of natural kind terms. I present four possible accounts - phenomenal internalism, deep internalism, strict externalism, and hybrid theory - as experimentally testable. Experiments examine chemical, botanical, and animal kinds, which figure in either discovery or transformation scenarios. The participants are recruited in universities located in Seoul, South Korea. I find that none of accounts is solely supported by experimental results, suggesting that semantic intuitions about natural kind terms vary even within a culture. Implications of these results on semantic theories are discussed.

Nadia Chernyak and Tamar Kushnir (Cornell University): The Importance of Choice for Moral Behavior: Giving Preschoolers Choice Increasing Sharing Behavior

People develop prosocial behaviors very early in ontogeny, but the mechanisms driving such early-emerging prosociality are not well understood. Here, we propose that the experience of choice is critically tied to the expression of young children's altruistic behavior. Three- and 4-year-olds were asked to allocate resources to an individual in need by either making a Costly Choice (allocating a resource they could have kept for themselves), Non-Costly Choice (allocating a resource that would otherwise be thrown away), or No Choice (instructed to allocate the resource). Subsequent prosociality was then measured by allowing children to then allocate new resources to a new individual. While the majority of children helped the first individual, children who were given costly alternatives were more likely to share resources with the new individual. Results are discussed in terms of a prosocial construal hypothesis, which suggests that children rationally infer their prosociality through the process of making difficult, autonomous choices.

Hossein Dabbagh (University of Oxford): In Search of Lost "Intuition"; Integrating the Psychology Epistemology of Intuition

In a series of papers, Peter Singer, has developed an argument for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuitions. He argues that since emotions distort our intuitive judgments, we can explain them away. I suggest, however, a defence on behalf of the intuitionists. I claim that Singer's position in moral psychology can be refuted by empirical challenges which are derived from cognitive science. In fact, Singer's understanding of intuitionism, I believe, is mistaken. Since he misconstrues the idea of "rationalism" as it figures in intuitionism. This paper helps clarify what is the role of "emotions" in rational tradition of intuitionism.

Dacey, Mike (Washington University in St. Louis): Association as a Semantic Level Construct

This paper presents a novel account of the concept of association and its role in psychological theorizing. According to this view, association is a highly abstract account of psychological processing that only captures the sequence of representations in a process. As such, I call it a semantic level construct, in Pylyshyn's terminology. Moreover, the view is instrumentalist about associations themselves. They are not features or kinds of processing; they are simply ways of expressing causal regularities in processing. This view of association captures a certain kind of explanation in psychology that is underappreciated: sometimes, the sequences of representations are themselves explanatory, even if we do not have an explanation for that sequence. I'll provide several examples of this kind of explanation. I will also discuss several alternative views of association and show how they face problems that my view does not.

Katherine Dunlop (University of Texas at Austin): Gareth Evans on Molyneux's Problem

Molyneux's Question concerns whether a blind subject with mastery of shape concepts would, if given sight, apply those concepts to visual data without having to learn how they correlate with tactual, haptic, and kinaesthetic data. Gareth Evans takes the question to be whether concepts of spatial features are specific to sense modalities. He answers in the negative by showing how the spatial content of experience (in whatever modality) is specified "egocentrically". Recent work disputes Evans's conclusion that egocentric spatial content must be represented in a single unified framework: it is argued that differences in how the modalities represent such content manifest at the level of conceptual mode-of-presentation or that of phenomenal content. I argue that such differences are ruled out on Evans's view of the connection between egocentric representation and behavior. I argue, further, that Evans rejects both the view that spatial concepts are abstracted from sense experience (in a particular modality) and the conception of experience imported by his critics.

Christopher Erb and Fiery Cushman (Brown University): Representing process in cases of double prevention

Across two experiments, we demonstrate that causal ascriptions in cases of double prevention depend on the temporal sequence of events. The results reveal that an unintentional double-preventer can receive high causal ascriptions in cases where a prevention attempt was in position to block an effect's occurrence (Experiments 1 and 2). If the prevention attempt was never in position to block the effect's occurrence (Experiment 1), or if the attempt to cause the effect was not taken until after the prevention attempt was thwarted (Experiment 2), low causal ratings were given to the double-preventer. These findings are discussed in light of a recent proposal that suggests two different modes of construal underlie causal ascription (Lombrozo, 2010).

Matthew Fisher, Joshua Knobe, Brent Strickland & Frank Keil (Yale University): The influence of social interaction on intuitions about objectivism and subjectivism

We present experimental and correlational evidence that interacting with others lead to a folk understandings of truth as objective. This effect is explained by the argue-to-win mindset, a mode of argument, which leads people to adopt an objectivist view so there can be a "winner" of the exchange. Experiment 1 demonstrates that in comparison to a non-social setting, people are more objectivist when considering their views in anticipation of an interaction with someone holding an opposing position. Experiment 2 finds this effect in more than just a limited set of emotionally loaded issues but also for less controversial topics. Experiment 3 and 4 demonstrate that only competitive social interactions lead to increases in objectivity ratings, leading us to conclude that the explanation for the increased objectivity is the argue-to-win mindset. Finally, in Experiment 5, we demonstrate that this effect occurs outside our experimental paradigm. We discuss how our finding could help inform research on moral realism and more broadly, how various types of social interaction can have important cognitive consequences.

Robert Foley (University College, Dublin): The Complex Action Criterion for Consciousness

This poster proposes a new criterion for the attribution of consciousness of an object to a subject. The complex action criterion of consciousness (CACC) is based on the claim that the ability to use information about an object flexibly is indicative of consciousness of that object. It is argued that this criterion is potentially dissociable from reportability, thus offering the opportunity to test whether the two types of access are dissociable. Exclusion tasks are discussed as a potential means for testing this, and it is suggested that with certain alterations they could serve as an experimental paradigm for testing for the dissociability of reportability and the capacities picked out by CACC.

Tobias A. Huber: Explanation in Neuroscience: Causal Mechanisms vs. Dynamical Models?

In this paper, I investigate mechanistic and model-based philosophical approaches to neuroscientific explanation. On mechanistic accounts, mathematical models are taken as explanatory if they describe mechanisms (Kaplan and Craver 2011; Bechtel 2011). In contrast, dynamicist accounts promote the view that not all neuroscientific phenomena are mechanistically explicable (Stepp et al. 2010; Silberstein and Chemero 2012). I argue that research in cognitive and systems neuroscience demonstrates the need for an extended mechanistic framework. Further, I suggest that dynamical models need to integrate mechanistic information about the targeted structural and functional brain networks. The compatibility of dynamical-mathematical with causal-mechanical models points towards a philosophical account, which can accommodate both the complexity of neurobiological phenomena and the methodological and explanatory plurality of neuroscientific research.

Courtney Humeny and Casandra Boushey (Carleton University): The role of anger and disgust in intuitions about health behaviors

Smoking, a once socially acceptable behaviour in North America is now viewed with repugnance. The current study examined whether anger and disgust have a role in the moralization of smoking. Participants (N=274) were assessed for smoking, anger, disgust sensitivity, and completed a modified version of the

Knobe Effect measure depicting either smoking or exercise. Emotion was hypothesized to influence moral judgments and smoking behaviors. Results indicate an interaction between irritability and disgust for intuitive judgments and an effect of behavior on explicit judgments. Higher rates of smoking related to lower disgust and higher rates of anger. Implications are made for the moralizing aspects of anger and disgust in smoking.

Zachary C. Irving (University of Toronto): I Wander About That Task... Why Mind-Wandering is Not Task-Unrelated Thought

At least 30 % of our waking thoughts can be classified as mind-wandering. Despite its pervasiveness, however, mind-wandering has been largely neglected within philosophy of mind. This is a shame because philosophers could contribute to conceptual debates within cognitive neuroscience over how to define mind-wandering. Most prominently, mind-wandering is defined as thought whose content is unrelated to one's current task(s). I argue that this definition cannot account for cases of mind-wandering while at rest (i.e. in the absence of a task) or mind-wandering with content related to an ongoing task like planning tutorials. Yet the reasons this definition fails suggest a more promising definition of mind-wandering as task-unguided, rather than task-unrelated thought. The prominence of such unguided thought could have implications for the philosophy of attention, dual-process theory, and epistemology.

Zoe Jenkin (City University of New York): Intramodular Effects and Epistemic Downgrade

In a series of recent papers, Susanna Siegel argues that if a perceptual experience is victim to a top-down effect that would constitute a violation of modularity, the experience deserves to be epistemically downgraded due to the circular structure of its formation. Yet the reasons for epistemic downgrade that she posits also apply to effects from stored intramodular associations. Therefore, even if modularity is true, and the effects on perception are explicable without appeal to cognitive influence, these experiences still deserve to be epistemically downgraded. Even modularity cannot provide us with the strong epistemological foundation that it seemed to promise.

T.J. Kasperbauer (Texas A&M University): Explanatory Unification in Cognitive Science

This poster attempts to identify the source of unifying explanations in cognitive science, utilizing Philip Kitcher's account of explanatory unification in order to do so. I focus specifically on the explanatory role of mechanisms and representation in cognitive science—two entities that appear to meet Kitcher's criteria for unified explanations. Though these have played a unifying function in the history of cognitive science, and continue to serve as a source of unification, I argue that their unifying power decreases as cognitive science becomes more specialized. I also highlight advantages of specialization that speak against the importance of unification.

Corey Maley and Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri- St. Louis): Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: The Ontology of Functional Mechanisms

We provide the foundations for an integrated science of cognition and behavior by offering an account of the teleological functions of multi-level functional mechanisms. The account applies to both biological traits and artifacts. Teleological functions are stable causal contributions towards the objective goals of organisms belonging to a biological population. The paradigmatic objective goals of organisms are survival and inclusive fitness, although organisms may have additional goals. Truthmakers for claims about teleological functions are non-teleological features of the world.

Ayca Mazman and Lauren Fink (University of Cincinnati): False Belief Attribution: An Investigation of the Neural Pattern Account

In developmental psychology, the false belief task is used to measure children's ability to attribute beliefs, intentionality etc., to others. Because children typically pass this test around four years of age, most researchers agree that by 4 years old children possess a theory of mind (ToM). The debate in ToM research lies in the discrepancies of implicit vs. explicit task passing. Researchers have reported that infants are passing the false belief task implicitly, via eye gaze measurement, as early as 13 months,

though they cannot explicitly, or verbally, pass it until 3 ½ or 4 years of age. Multiple, and often contradictory, theories exist in an attempt to explain why there is this gap, or the illusion of a gap, between implicit and explicit passing, as demonstrated by the false belief task. This paper focuses on the implications, and ultimate invalidity, of a neural pattern account proposed to explain the gap.

Irina Meketa (Boston University): A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition

A widespread assumption in experimental comparative (animal) cognition is that, barring compelling evidence to the contrary, the null hypothesis should be the hypothesis postulating the simplest cognitive ontology consistent with the animal's behavior. I call this assumption the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity, or PoCS. In this essay, I show that PoCS is both pervasive and unjustified.

Ryan Miller (Brown University), Ivar Hannikainen (University of Sheffield) and Fiery Cushman (Brown University): Bad Actions or Bad Outcomes? Differentiating Affective Contributions to the Moral Condemnation of Harm

Several lines of convergent evidence suggest that affect influences moral judgment in instances of harm. However, despite much recent research, the source of this affect remains unclear. One obvious contender is empathy; simulating the victim's pain could lead one to judge an action as wrong ("outcome aversion"). An alternative, less obvious source is one's own aversion to performing the action itself ("action aversion"). To dissociate these alternatives, we developed a scale that assessed individual aversions to 1) witnessing others experience painful outcomes (e.g. seeing someone fall down stairs), and 2) performing actions that are harmless yet aversive (e.g. stabbing a fellow actor with a fake stage knife). In the context of moral dilemmas where harming one is required to save many, we found that action aversion, but not outcome aversion, consistently predicted condemnation of the harmful action.

Lisa Miracchi (Rutgers University): Making the Competence View a Contender

The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) is widely thought to be the only naturalistically and scientifically plausible account of intentionality, in large part because of the success of the computational research program in cognitive science (CRP). In this paper I defend the plausibility of an alternative, which I call the "Competence View". I argue that the Competence View is in fact better supported by, and provides a more attractive framework for, CRP than RTM.

Andrew Peterson (Rotman Institute of Philosophy): The Brain at War: Ethical and epistemological problems of propranolol therapy for combat-induced psychological injury

Combat induced post-traumatic stress disorder has become a growing health concern for the U.S. Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs. Recent advances in psychopharmacology have yielded drugs that may be effective for treating this population. However, ethicists point out that such therapy may have deleterious consequences, such as the unintended alteration of memory recall. This presentation reviews recent advances in clinical psychiatry, namely the Dissociative Subtype of PTSD, which may change the way physicians understand the condition. It is argued that the ethical problems raised thus far may be misguided due to an insensitivity to the epistemic problems inherent to neuropsychiatry.

Chris Viger (University of Western Ontario): A Model of Concept Acquisition

I present a model of concept acquisition supported by recent findings in cognitive science. I present a challenge to the possibility of increasing the expressive power of our conceptual system from an extreme nativist LOT perspective. As an alternative, I offer my acquired language of thought hypothesis (ALOT) with converging evidence from neuroscience and psychology to support that view. From this framework, I explain how concept acquisition is possible as a "bootstrapping" process using placeholders.

Michael Weisberg (University of Pennsylvania): Remeasuring Man

Samuel George Morton (1799–1851) was the most highly regarded American scientist during the first half of the 19th century. Despite his role in founding scientific racism, it had been assumed that he was a

careful empirical scientist. In the 1980s, Morton's integrity was called into question by Stephen Jay Gould in *The Mismeasure of Man*. Morton's work, Gould wrote, contained "a patchwork of fudging and angling in the clear interest of controlling a priori convictions" (Gould, 1981, 54).

Morton stayed out of public view for another thirty years or so until in June, 2011, a team of physical anthropologists (hereafter Lewis et al.) published an extensive reanalysis of Morton and Gould's work in *PLoS Biology*, reporting that "Our results resolve this historical controversy, demonstrating that Morton did not manipulate data to support his preconceptions, contra Gould" (2011, abstract).

This paper argues that, contra Lewis et al., that most of Gould's arguments against Morton are sound. Although Gould made some errors and overstated his case in a number of places, he revealed important sources of bias and gave prima facie evidence, unrefuted by Lewis et al., that Morton mismeasured skulls in *Crania Americana*. Specifically, I argue that there is evidence that Morton mismeasured crania to conform to his racial biases, that sexual dimorphism biased Morton's averages, and that Morton incorrectly concluded that Caucasians had the highest cranial capacity in his sample when, in fact, Native Americans have the highest cranial capacity. The current analysis thus reestablishes the significance of Gould's conclusions and forces a reconsideration of Morton's claims.

Session 2: Friday, June 14

SAYLES HALL

Cecilia Mun (Arizona State University): What is Emotion? What are We Asking?

Emotions have been an area of research and theorizing shared between philosophers and psychologists for more than a century. A central goal in emotion research and theorizing is to provide an account of what emotions are. However, the various approaches to answering this question reveal that these concerns go beyond concerns regarding the metaphysical nature of emotions. In this paper, I identify two distinct lines of inquiry that may be identified as being concerned with what emotions are: the question of what is emotion from the metaphysical perspective and the question of what is emotion from the semantic perspective. From the first perspective, the question of what emotions are is understood in terms of being concerned with the metaphysical nature of emotions. From the second perspective, the question of what emotions are is understood in terms of being concerned with the meaning of emotion terms. More specifically, it is concerned with relationship between theoretical emotion terms and ordinary language emotion terms. Furthermore, I illustrate how these two perspectives interact in order to yield four kinds of theories of emotion: realism, instrumentalism, eliminativism, and eliminative-realism about emotion. Finally, I propose that understanding theories of emotion in accordance with these four taxonomic categories may provide us with an alternative perspective on theories of emotion that may allow for further progress in interdisciplinary theorizing about what emotions are.

Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston), Eddy Nahimas (Georgia State University), Jason Shepard (Emory University) and Chandra Sripada (University of Michigan): The Free Will Inventory

Psychologists and philosophers are increasingly interested in how people ordinarily think about free will, determinism, dualism, and responsibility, in part because recent data suggests that undermining beliefs about free will can influence behavior. Existing psychometric measures of such beliefs are problematic. We have developed a new psychometric instrument with better philosophical face validity that measures a wider range of beliefs about free will, responsibility, dualism, determinism, and relationships between these beliefs. Here, we present the items in our inventory's three subscales and statements that measure philosophical beliefs; validation studies; and relationships between responses to our inventory's subscales and other psychometric scales.

Jonathan Philips and Alex Worsnip (Yale University): Motivating Internalism

Much theoretical and empirical work in moral psychology purports to cast doubt on motivational internalism, the claim that there is a conceptual connection between making a normative judgment and being motivated to act on that judgment. In this paper we present a critique of previous experimental studies on this topic followed by a study of our own, which overcomes the limitations of previous studies. We find that, at least in some cases, ordinary attributions of normative judgments to agent are more strongly influenced by whether that agent is motivated to comply, than by whether the agent assents to the relevant normative proposition.

David Sackris (University of Buffalo): An Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Modals

Contrary to the popular sentiment in the literature, I argue a plausible case can be made for an invariant semantic content of utterances making use of modals epistemically. I shall argue that an invariant semantics does do a reasonable job addressing problem cases that are typically appealed to in arguments concerning the fitness of any account of the semantics of epistemic modals. I shall argue that an invariant semantics, when combined with a performative account of such utterances, is able to capture speaker intuitions in the central case of speaker retraction typically focused on by theorists working in this area.

Leland Saunders (Seattle Pacific University): Reason and Emotion; Not Reason or Emotion

One central question in metaethics is whether moral judgments are the products of reason, or the products of emotions. Cognitivists maintain that moral judgments are the products of reason and express moral beliefs, whereas non-cognitivists maintain that moral judgments are the products of the emotions and express certain affective or other non-cognitive mental states, such as anger or like/dislike. The choice between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is often cast as a choice between Kant (cognitivism) and Hume (non-cognitivism). This paper argues that the choice between Kant and Hume assumes a certain view of reason and emotion two sharply dichotomized, easily distinguishable and wholly separable cognitive faculties, each with their own distinctive and proprietary operations and outputs (beliefs and emotions, respectively). A body of empirical research, however, suggests that how moral judgments are produced perhaps cannot be meaningfully understood by simply choosing between either reason or emotion, because there are good reasons for thinking that “reason” and “emotion” do not pick out two wholly separable cognitive faculties that could in some “pure” form be entirely and singularly causally responsible for producing moral judgments. The evidence suggests that moral judgment may involve both reason and emotion, but in a way that is not simply a function of independent contributions of two sharply dichotomized, easily distinguishable and wholly separable cognitive faculties, reason and emotion, each with their own distinctive operations; rather, the evidence supports the possibility that reason and emotion are highly integrated systems that both contribute to the production of moral judgments through complex causal interactions.

Elizabeth Schechter (Washington University in St. Louis): Self-Reference in the Split-Brain Subject

Suppose that, as many neuropsychologists believe, left and right hemisphere of a split-brain subject are associated with distinct thinkers. What do these thinkers think about, when they try to think self-consciously? Davis (1997) suggested that they think about the split-brain animal as a whole; their I-thoughts are therefore not strictly self-referring, and thus these thinkers are not strictly self-conscious, and thus are not persons, but merely subpersonal parts of the split-brain human being, despite being thinkers. The paper argues against the stability of this position, and in favor of the apparently startling conclusion that all I-thoughts in the split-brain subject are false.

Chelsea Schein and Kurt Gray (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill): Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism

Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience.

More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give a skewed account of moral cognition.

Ben Schwan (University of Wisconsin-Madison): Looking in our Heads: Distinguishing Theory Theory’s account of the conscious stream from the Inner Sense Model’s introspection

In order to avoid obvious counterexamples in which agents self-ascribe propositional attitudes according to private mental events, the Theory Theory of self-knowledge must allow for some kind access to inner-speech, inner-imagery, proprioception, and the like. At first blush, however, such access looks worryingly like the introspective faculty posited by the Inner Sense Model. If this is correct, Theory Theory risks self-defeat. In this paper, I explicate this worry then argue that it is ultimately avoidable. Specifically, the Theory Theorist can successfully distinguish her access to the “conscious stream” from the Inner Sense Model’s introspection by maintaining 1) that while the happenings of the conscious stream are relevant to propositional attitude ascriptions, they alone do not constitute propositional attitudes; and 2) that the information of the conscious stream bears on propositional attitude ascriptions in just the same way that external evidence does.

James Southworth (University of Western Ontario): What is a Feeling? Revisiting William James’ Theory of Emotion

I argue that James’ theory of emotion has been continually misunderstood. By situating his feeling theory of emotion within his stream of consciousness theory, I hope to show that he has a far more nuanced conception of emotion than has previously been recognized. I do this by drawing out an implicit distinction that runs throughout *The Principles* – that between primary feeling and secondary feeling. Emotion is a secondary feeling, which includes an outward-directed feeling/belief. In this way, James is able to account for the intentionality of emotion.

Bradley Thomas (Pennsylvania State University), Erik Asp (University of Chicago), Michael Koenigs (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Matthew Sutterer (University of Iowa), Steven Anderson (University of Iowa) and Daniel Tranel (University of Iowa): Early prefrontal lesions impair the maturation of moral judgment

The neural systems required for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency are not well understood. Here we show in a unique sample of neurological patients that focal lesions involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex, acquired during development, result in an abnormally egocentric pattern of moral judgment. In response to simple hypothetical moral scenarios, the patients were more likely than comparison participants to endorse self-interested actions that involved breaking moral rules or physically harming others in order to benefit themselves. Critically, we show that this pattern (which we have also observed in persons with psychopathy) differs from that of patients with adult-onset ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions—the latter group had abnormally utilitarian moral judgments, but showed normal rejection of the egocentric rule violations observed in developmental-onset ventromedial prefrontal cortex patients. This novel contrast of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions acquired during development versus during adulthood yields compelling new evidence that vmPFC is a

critical neural substrate for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency that goes beyond self-interest to consider the welfare of others. Disruption to this affective neural system early in life interrupts moral development.

J. Robert Thompson (Mississippi State University): Behavior Rules and the Logical Problem: Striking Back

Robert Lurz articulates what has come to be called the logical problem, as follows: “The question that constitutes the logical problem, then, is whether an experimental protocol can be designed whose positive results can be plausibly explained and predicted by a mindreading hypothesis but not by its complementary behavior reading hypothesis” (2009, p. 306). In this paper, I review some recent progress in dealing with the logical problem and develop a framework that mentalistic responses may adopt in addressing the logical problem.

Blake Thompson (Virginia Tech): Certainty and Uncertainty Revisited: Color as a Psychobiological Property

In his essay “Objectivity and Subjectivity Revisited: Color as a Psychobiological Property”, Gary Hatfield asserts a claim about the nature of color. I propose to assess the extent to which Hatfield is justified in asserting this claim. Specifically, I intend to explicate four suppressed premises of the argument that Hatfield gives for this claim and examine their tenability. My conclusion is not that Hatfield is wrong. Rather, I show only that Hatfield’s confidence in his thesis is unjustified due to problematic features of the premises on which its truth is conditional.

John Turri and Peter Blow (University of Waterloo): Exculpatory Pretense

It’s a trivial truth that if someone blamelessly breaks a rule, then they break the rule. They have acted incorrectly according to the rule, even if they shouldn’t be criticized for it. In short, blameless transgression is still transgression. As obvious as that sounds in the abstract, humans exhibit a strong and consistent tendency to deny it in specific, concrete cases. We report three experiments that document this surprising tendency, which we call “exculpatory pretense.” The tendency is interesting in its own right and has important implications for normative theorizing. In particular, common “counterexamples” to certain normative theories are perfectly suited to trigger exculpatory pretense. This considerably weakens the force of objections based on such examples.

Jonathan Vanderhoek (University of Texas, Austin): Moral Judgment and Empathic Perspective-Taking

Sometimes we need to take others’ emotions into account when making moral judgments. This accounting, however, is not always easy. Empathic perspective-taking is a complex process that uses our own emotional resources to grasp the emotional experiences of others. This empathic understanding helps us to recognize the moral significance of others’ emotions. In this way empathic perspective-taking performs an epistemic function that supports the making of informed moral judgments. Several theorists in the literature deny that perspective-taking plays this role. However, their challenges fail. Empathic perspective-taking is a unique epistemic resource. The better skilled persons are at knowing when and how to use it, the better equipped they are to make moral judgments in situations involving others’ emotions. Not everyone is capable of using perspective-taking, but for those who are, excellence at moral judgment requires a proficiency in using perspective-taking.

Caren Walker (University of California, Berkeley), Tania Lombrozo (University of California, Berkeley), Christine Legare (University of Texas at Austin) and Alison Gopnik (University of California, Berkeley): Explanation, Projectibility, and Causal Learning

Three experiments test the hypothesis that engaging in explanation prompts children to favor inductively rich properties when generalizing to novel cases. In Experiment 1, preschoolers prompted to explain


during a causal learning task were more likely to override a tendency to generalize according to perceptual similarity and instead extend an internal feature to an object that shared a causal property. In Experiment 2, we replicated this effect of explanation in a case of label extension. Experiment 3 demonstrated that explanation improves memory for internal features and labels, but impairs memory for superficial features. We conclude that explaining influences causal learning by prompting children to privilege inductively rich properties.

David Winchell (Washington University in St. Louis): Self-Deception, Agency and Responsibility

I argue for a new view of self-deception in response to Alfred Mele's influential account, which I find lacking in two key ways.


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